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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is no secret that the fight against desertification isn't going
well. In the two decades since the United Nations Convention to
Combat
Desertification
("UNCCD")
came
into
force,'
desertification-defined as degradation in the quality of "arid,
semi-arid, and dry subhumid" land areas -has
worsened
considerably. Recent United Nations estimates suggest that fiftytwo percent of drylands currently under agricultural cultivation are
moderately or severely degraded, and 12 million hectares of
productive land become barren each year due to desertification
and drought.3 And while drylands are the focus of the UNCCD, the
challenge isn't limited to them: somewhere around twenty percent
of land worldwide is moderately or severely degraded and most
experts predict this percentage will increase in coming decades.4
In the face of these numbers and trends, many within the
desertification community and beyond are calling for a fresh
approach to the problem: the establishment of a global goal to

1.
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, June 17, 1994,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/15/Rev.7 [hereinafter UNCCD].
2. Id. art. 1(a). These arid, semi-arid, and dry subhumid areas, which are often
collectively referred to as drylands, "cover approximately 40% of the world's land area, and
are most prevalent in Africa and Asia." See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT
GROUP,

GIOBAL

DRYIANDS:

A

U.N.

SYSTEM-WIi)E

RESPONSE

15

(2011),

http://www.unemg.org/images/emgdocs/publications/Global-Drylands

available at

Full Report.pdf

[http://perma.cc/RLG7-GJQA].
3.

See

UNCCD

SECRETARIAF,

ZERO

NET

LAND

DEGRADATION:

A

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT GOAL FOR Rio +20 13 (2012) [hereinafter "ZNLD BRIEF"], available at
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Rio+20/UNCCDPolicyBrief-ZeroNetLa
ndDegradation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4MN4-E2RL];
UNCCD
SECRETARIAT,
DESERTIFICATION:
TIlE
INVISIBI.E
FRONTLINE
(2014),
available
at
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumeiitLibrary/Publications/DesertificationThe%20inv
isiblefrontline.pdf [http://perma.cc/AF8A-CMLK].
It is worth noting, however, that

definitional and measurement differences in desertification abound-a problem discussed in
more detail inia Part II.A-and that some of the acres rendered barren each year due to
drought may naturally return to a productive state.
4. See ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 3; see aLso Technical Support Team of the UNCCD,
Issues Brief.
Deusertification, Land Degradation and Drought, at 1-2 (2012), http://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1803tstissuesdldd.pdf
[http://perma.
cc/V8SZ-PPFA]

IMPROVEMENT.

(citing Z.G.

BAI ET AL.,

GLOBAL ASSFsSMENT OF IAND DFGRADATION AND

1. IDENTIIlCATION BY IJMOTE1

SFNSING, Report 2008/01, ISRIC-World Soil

Information, Wageningen); MILI.ENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN
WELL-BEING:

DESERTIFICATION SYNTHESIS (2005), available at http://www.unep.org/maweb/

documents/document.355.aspx.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZZW5-ENKQJ.
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achieve a "land-degradation neutral world., 5 This goal gained
considerable traction after it was included in the outcome
document of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development, better known as the "Rio+20" Conference."6 The
UNCCD Secretariat has since proposed that the world adopt the
more concrete goal of "Zero Net Land Degradation by 2030."' As
the UNCCD has explained, this "neutralizing" of land degradation
would come about through "a global shift in land stewardship such
that degradation of new areas is avoided, and unavoidable
degradation is offset by restoring an equal amount of already
degraded land in the same time and in the same ecosystem."'
Few would argue with the goals of slowing land degradation and
restoring degraded land where possible. And there is obvious
rhetorical appeal to the "land-degradation neutral world" slogan, as
it lends specificity to a problem that has proven challenging to
measure and manage."' The frame of "neutrality" may also be
gaining appeal due to the proliferation of domestic "no net loss"
targets in biodiversity offsetting programs, as well as the push for
"carbon neutrality" within the realm of climate change policy.'8
However, the call for land degradation neutrality has not been
universally celebrated. One major reason for this resistance is that
it remains unclear how this goal might be translated from an
aspirational objective that sounds good in the abstract, into

206,
5. See, e.g., ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3; The Future We Want, G.A. Res. 66/288,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/288, (Sept. 11, 2012) [hereinafter "Rio+20 Outcome Document"]; see
also Pamela Chasek et al., Operationalizing Zero Net Land Degradation: The Next Stage in
InternationalEffirs to Combat Desertification?, 112 J. ARIiD ENV'Ts 5, 5 (2014) (noting the need
for urgent action to reverse land degradation).
6. See Rio+20 Outcome Document, supra note 5. The "Rio+20" nickname stems fron the
fact that the 2012 conference occurred 20 years after the first Earth Summit, also in Rio de
Janeiro, in 1992. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Developinent (1992), UNITE) NATIONS
[http://perma.cc/8SPZ(May 23, 1997), http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html
RWEX].
7.

See UNCCD SI,'cRETrARIAr, A STRONGER UNCCD FOR A LAND-DEGRAI)ATION NEUTRAl

WORLD 7 (2013) [hereinafter "A STRONGER UNCCD"], available at http://www.unccd.int/
Lists/SiteDocurmentLibrary/Publications/Stronger UNCCDLDNWoirld-issue%20brief%20
04 09_13%20web.pdf [http://perma.cc/LP8L-WB8B].
8. Global Conference Steps up Action to Move to a Land-DegradationNeutral World, UNCCD,
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.unccd.int/en/media-center/MediaNews/Pages/highlight
detail.aspx?HighlightlD=145 [http://perma.cc/PW2H-BF77]; see also A STRONGER UNCCD,
supra note 7, at 9.
9. As the UNCCD Secretariat has explained, the vision of land degradation neutrality "is
strikingly clear and easy to communicate." A STRONGER UNCCD, supra note 7, at 7.
10. See infra Parts III-IV for more details on these programs.
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concrete actions with verifiable outcomes. In particular, it is not
clear whether the concept can be imbued with legal and scientific
integrity so that it becomes more than just a "platitude."'" Indeed,
in examining previous pushes for land neutrality, some scholars
have posited that "no net loss" policies may be no more than "an
effective political diversion," erecting "an illusion " that
crumbles
2
under scrutiny from ecological and political science.
This article looks at ways to avoid these risks and to advance
global land degradation neutrality into a concept-and, eventually,
a program-that has legal and scientific integrity, such that it
delivers tangible gains. We do so by turning backwards to move
forward, drawing on lessons learned from two ongoing, landcentered policy attempts similarly framed around goals of
neutrality: the "no net loss" wetlands policy embraced by the
United States' Wetlands Mitigation Banking ("WMB") program, as
representative of a broad class of "biodiversity offset" programs
emerging around the world; and Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation ("REDD+"), an international
program aimed at preserving, enhancing, and restoring forests as
carbon "sinks." These examples provide potential frameworks for
progress, but also act as harbingers of some of the challenges that
land degradation neutrality may encounter in moving from theory
to practical implementation. Three key issues emerge for further
consideration on the path to a "land-degradation neutral world"
("LDNW"): (1) how to define and measure the problem-"land
degradation"-in scientifically and legally meaningful ways; (2)
how to successfully pursue "neutrality" as an organizing principle;
and (3) how to balance the local and the global, and the public
and the private, in the administration of such a program. Each of
these issues exists at the nexus of science and law, and they are
interrelated in ways that we parse in our discussion.
Little academic attention has yet been paid to the concept of
land degradation neutrality. The lack of scholarship to date is
11.
See Luc Gnacadja, UNCCED Executive Secretary, Introductory Remarks: The
Occasion of the Consultative Meeting on a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) on Land
Degredation Neutral World (LDNW) and on the Associated Target for a Zero Net Land
Degredation (ZNLD) (June 26, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/
SiteDocumentLibrary/secretariat/2013/Statements%20ES/statement%20of%2ES%20for%
20LDNW%20Meeting.pdf [http://perma.cc/KQH4-69GT]).
12. Susan Walker et al., Why Bartering Biodiversily Fai&, 2 CONSERVATION LEITERS 149 1,
154 (2009).
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unsurprising given the goal's recent emergence. There is, however,
urgency to understanding how land degradation neutrality might
proceed and the degree to which it should be embraced, as it is
currently under consideration for inclusion as one of the United
("SDGs"). 13
Nation's post-2015 "Sustainable Development Goals"
These goals have historically played an important role in helping
shape the international community's development agenda and
funding priorities,14 such that embracing land degradation
neutrality as an SDG might have major practical consequences.
Furthermore, there is also an active debate regarding how to move
forward within the UNCCD, and how the Convention might fit (or
not fit) with the broader goal of LDNW.' 5 Fleshing out the concept

13.
DEP'T

See Opern Working Group J'Ioposalfor Sustainabie Developtent Goas, UNITED NATIONS
ECON.
& Soc. AFFAIRS, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/
OF

documents/1579SDGs%20Proposal.pdf [http://perma.cc/KXX9-HDEJ] (last visited Jan. 9,
2015). One main outcome of the Rio+20 Conference was that member States agreed to a
process to develop a set of Sustainable Development Goals, which will build upon the
Millennium Development Goals and converge with the post 2015 development agenda. A
U.N. Working Group is tasked with developing a draft set of goals for presentation to the
U.N. General Assembly in 2014. See Sustainable Development Goas, UNITEI) NATIONS DEn1"r OF
ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRs, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1300
[http://perma.cc/G9XP-2JRL] (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); Progress leport of the Open. Working
Group of the GeneralAssembly on SustainableDevelopment Goa&, UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF ECON.
54-55, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
& Soc. ArFAIRS

3238summaryallowg.pdf [http://perma.cc/LQ9U-HSZ9] (last visited Jan. 9, 2015)
(observing that "[h]alting and reversing land degradation will be critical to meeting future
food needs," while also questioning "whether the objective is sufficiently ambitious, given the
current extent of land degradation globally and the potential benefits from land restoration
not only for food security but also for mitigating climate change"); see also Chasek et al.,
OperationalizingZNLD: The Next Stage, supra note 5, at 5.
14. Pamela S. Chasek, Follow the Money: Navigating theInernationalAid Maze for Dryland
Development, 4 J. INT'L.. ORG. STuD., 77, 88 (2013) (noting that the UNCCD has tried to

Elina
"bandwagon" with the Millennium Development Goals to increase funding); seealso
Ecolo*y of Land Degradation, 36 ANNUAL Rr'v. ENVI,. RESOURCES
Andersson et al., The Political
295, 308 (2011) ("Changes in the dominant development discourse can be traced to the
endorsement of the Millennium Declaration by the U.N. member states in 2000, which
shifted the focus from fostering economic growth per se to encouraging 'pro-poor growth'
and increasingly incorporating environmental concerns in the development process."
(internal citations onitted)).
15. See Follow-up to the Outcomes of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
(creating an
(Sept. 2014)
UNCCD Dec. 8/COP.11
Development (Rio+20),
intergovernmental working group to "(1) establish a science-based definition of land
degradation neutrality in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas; (2) develop options
relating to arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas that Parties might consider should they
strive to achieve land degradation neutrality; and (3) advise the Convention on the
implications for its ctrrent and future strategy, programmes and the resource
requirements"); see also Chasek et al., OperationalizingZNI1): The Next Stage, supranote 5, at 5.
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of LDNW may also produce insights relevant to both of these
discussions, as well as to the ongoing debate about how combating

land degradation might play a role in future international climate
mitigation regimes. 16

We are cautiously optimistic about the promise that the LDNW
framework holds for reorienting thinking and action around the
problem of land degradation, provided that the implementation
process is executed thoughtfully.
Most importantly, the
accountability created by an LDNW framework could help generate
better outcomes and increased funding for actions to prevent and

reverse land degradation. It also could be used as the impetus for
altering national legal baselines to require restoration as a
condition of private development within the country. More
broadly, it may empower pluralistic experimentation on land
degradation management and measurement models. Ultimately,
however, this article raises more questions than answers-an
appropriate move at this early stage of LDNW development. In

particular, we argue

that WMB and REDD+ flag important

concerns about the relationship between program goals and the

definitions and measurements

derived

therefrom;

about the

challenges of using "neutrality" as an organizing framework; and

about the appropriate scale of the program and the appropriate
actors to involve in order to attract funding while preserving the
integrity of the program's original goals. For LDNW, the key
takeaway is that early, thoughtful, inclusive design discussions will
be of paramount importance in heading off some of these issues
and creating a program that delivers real results to people
struggling to cope in marginalized lands.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides scientific

background on land degradation and explores the genesis and
16. While the current Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change restricts participation of land use mitigation credits to the forestry sector,
and even severely circumscribes their use within this sector, see in/ra note 181, many
commentators have suggested that land use mitigation activities might play a larger role in
future regimes. See, e.g., Gillian A. Cerbu, Brent M. Swallow & Dara Y. Thompson, Locating
REDD: A Global Survey and Analysis of REDD Readiness and DevionstrationActivities, 14 ENVTL.
ScI. & POL'Y 168, 169 (2011) (noting that REDD+ is spurring movement towards including
"net negative changes in carbon stocks across all lands and land uses" within future
international compliance mechanisms); Ingrid J. Visseren-Hamakers et al., Trade-Offs, CoBenefits and Safeguards: Current Debates on thie Breadth of IF)D+,4 CURRENT OPINION ENVTL.
SUSTAINABIL.riY 646, 649 (2012) (noting complex tensions over whether to broaden REDD+
beyond forests to include agriculture).
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current status of the LDNW goal. Part III describes the structure
of, and key challenges faced by, the WMB and REDD+ programs.
With this background, Part IV moves on to examine the lessons
that LDNW can learn from these past attempts at designing a land
management program framed in terms of "neutrality." Part V
concludes the discussion.
II.

GENESIS AND STATUS OF

LDNW GOAL

A. Understanding Land Degradation
1. Defining the Term
In striving for land degradation neutrality, it is first necessary to
confront the complex question of what land degradation is. In its
brief presented to Rio+20 calling for LDNW, the UNCCD
Secretariat defined land degradation as:
Reduction or loss of the biological or economic productivity and
complexity of rainfed cropland, irrigated cropland, or range, pasture,
forest and woodlands resulting from land uses or from a process or
combination of processes, including processes arising from human
activities and habitation patterns, such as:

(i) soil erosion caused by

wind and/or water; (ii) deterioration of the physical, chemical and
biological or economic properties of soil; and (iii) long-term loss of
natural vegetation.17
This tracks the definition of desertification used within the
The complexity of this definition illustrates the
UNCCD.' 8
challenges involved in defining a concept as broad as "land
degradation."19

17.
18.

ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 6.
In fact, this definition is taken essentially verbatim from the UNCCD, which defines

"desertification" in this same manner but limits it to "arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid
areas." UNCCD, suprra note 1, art. I(a), (g).
19. It is worth noting that although the quoted definition is the most legally entrenched
and is widely accepted, it is not used universally. See Michael M. Verstraete, RobertJ. Scholes
& Mark Stafford Smith, Climate and Desertification: Looking at an Old Problem Through New
Len.es, 7 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & EN'v'T 421 (2009) (explaining that the UNCCD's definition
is widely accepted). Alternative definitions track this one, but often in simpler terms. See,
e.g., Technical Support Team of the UNCCD, supra note 4, at I (defining land degradation
as "any diminishment of biodiversity and ecosystem functioning that negatively impacts the
provisioning of ecosystem services and ultimately impedes poverty eradication and
sustainable

development");

see also Andersson

et al.,

supra note

14, at 308

("Land
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At a biological level, land degradation manifests as "persistent
reduction in biological productivity."' Depending on the land in
question, reduced biological productivity might produce different
consequences: in cropland, it might reduce soil fertility and yield
per acre over time; in rangeland, it may reduce the land's carrying
capacity for cattle; in forests, it could reduce the provision of
ecosystem services like water filtration and retention. 2 ' Each of
these biological consequences also carries economic consequences,
though some are more readily commoditized than others (e.g.,
changes in yield per acre can easily be measured in dollar terms,
whereas declining ecosystem services often cannot be).
The
breadth of the UNCCD's definition of land degradation thus
captures the many diverse manifestations of the problem, but it
also creates potential tension. Are we worried about the ecological
function or economic productivity of land? The likely answer is
both. But how are we to strike a balance between the two? One
can imagine that solutions and interventions might look quite
different depending on how one treats the value of noncommoditized ecosystem services as compared to more readily
measurable services like agricultural output.23 We will return to this

tension in Part IV below, where we explore in more detail the
challenges of defining and measuring land degradation neutrality.
degradation is long-term loss of ecosystem function and service, caused by disturbances from
which the system cannot recover unaided.").
20.

ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 11.
See ELIZABETH COREuL, TIIE NEGOTIArED DESEwr: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE IN TIlE
NEGOTIATIONS OF TIHE CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESER'IFICIx ON (1999) (Dissertation,

21.

Link6ping Univ.). Of course, ecosystem service provision occurs across these land types. See
J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and Ecosyslem Services: Straleges for State and Local Governments, 17 N.Y.U.

ENVrL. L.J. 424, 426-27 (2008) (observing that "[i]n recent years... ecologists and
economists focusing on agriculture have forged a more complete vision of the capacity of
agricultural lands. They see farms as housing the natural capital capable of providing a
stream of diverse good and services, including ecosystem services such as increased
biodiversity, carbon sequestration, pollination, groundwater recharge, and improvement of
water quality."); Chasek et al., Operationalizing ZNLD:

The Next Stage, supra note 5, at 6

(explaining the persistent reduction of biodiversity as a defining feature of land
degradation).
22. Cf generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem
Services, 22J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2007).

23.

(f Rep. Prepared for the Secretariat of the UNCCD, Zero Net Land Degradation: A

New Sustainable Development Goal for Rio+20, 4 (May 2012) (by Rattan Lal et al.), http://

www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDoctlmentLibrary/secretariat/2012/Zero%2ONet%2OLand%2ODe
gradation %2oReport%20UNCCD%2May%202012%20background.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
7QMR-DQ3Y] (describing land degradation as concerning both land productivity and
provision of other ecosystem services, without probing the tension between the two).
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The emphasis on the word "persistent" in the definition above
highlights another challenge in defining land degradation. The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment suggests that degradation occurs
when land does not return to its expected level of productivity after
a stress is removed.2 '4 For example, if land suffers from drought for
several years and consequently loses productivity, but recovers after
rains return, the phenomenon is not one of land degradation. 25 But
it is not always easy to determine when exactly a stress like drought
has been "removed," so as to define the line between a droughtinduced state of deterioration and the type of persistent loss in
productivity that constitutes actual "land degradation."2 6
One
prominent example of this challenge was seen in the vigorous
debate about whether the African Sahel, which suffered
catastrophic dry conditions throughout the second half of the
twentieth century, was simply enduring a prolonged drought, or
whether localized land management practices were contributing to
the persistence of overly dry conditions.2 7
Many blamed the
conditions on unsustainable farming and grazing practices. 2" More
recent research has shown that it was in fact the oceans that
contributed to most of the Sahel's long-term climate variabilityi.e. the decades of drought-and to the resultant desert-like
conditions, as opposed to on-the-ground mismanagement. 29 Such
24. MILI.ENNIuM ECOSYSTEM ASSE-SSMENT, supra note 4, at 4.
25. See Alan Grainger et al., Desertification and Climate Change: The Casie for Greater
Convergence, 5 MITIGATION AND AI)AP-TATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 361-77, (2000)

(explaining that the identification of long-term land degradation trends is "made difficult by
short-term fluctuations").
26. See id.; seealso M. Seely et al., Advances in Desertification and Climate Change Research:
Are They Accessible
fr A1plication to Enhance Adaptive Capacity?, 64 GLOBAL & PLANETARY

CHANGE 236, 237 (2008).
27. See Alessandra Giannini, Michela Biasutti & Michel M. Verstraete, A Climate ModelBased Reieiew of Drought in the Sahel: Desertification, theRe-Greening and Climate Change, 64
GLOBAL & PLANETARY CH-IANGE 119, 119 (2008).

28. SeeAndersson et al., supra note 14, at 299.
29. See Giannini, Biasutti & Verstraete, supra note 27, at 120; S.M. Herrmann & C.F.
Hutchinson, The Changing Contexts of the Desertification Debate, 63 J. ARID ENV'TS 538, 542

(2005). More specifically, recent modeling suggests that sea surface temperatures are a
major contributor to rainfall levels in the Sahel, and that the area's "progression from the
wetter-than-average 1950's and 1960's to the drier-than-average 1970's and 1980's... is
related to a generalized pattern of warming of the global tropical oceans, especially of the
Indian Ocean, combined with enhanced warming of the southern compared to the northern
tropical Atlantic Ocean." Id.at 120-21. Still, the literature supports some contribution, if
minor, of local land-use changes to forcing the drought, either directly through changes in
the local surface energy and water fluxes, see
S.M. Hagos et al., Assevsment of Uncertainties in the
Reponrse of the African Monsoon Precipitationto Land Use Change Simulated by a Regional Model, 43
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experiences suggest that it is not necessarily accurate to classify
even longer-term changes in land productivity as "degradation."
Knowing where to draw this line is perplexing but important, as
solutions that focus on responding to socio-economic causes of
land degradation are only likely to be effective when such localized
actions contribute meaningfully to an area's decline in biological
productivity.
2. Extent of the Problem
This challenge of identifying "persistent" degradation is
compounded by the technological and practical challenge of
measuring all the land of the planet to determine its relative
health. Land degradation is typically measured by assessing land
cover data captured via satellite, but land cover is criticized as a
weak proxy for degradation." Accuracy can be improved by pairing
satellite imaging with local measurements and observations, but at
greater expense of time and money.3 ' And even if accuracy can be
achieved in measurements at a certain time, as the above discussion
suggests, the "greatest challenge in mapping land degradation"
may be "determining what the 'non-degraded' vegetation
production or reference condition for any parcel of land or pixel
should be." 32 As a result of these challenges, considerable debate
is. 33
persists about just how great the problem of land degradation

There is general agreement that the problem is severe and will only
get more pressing as population growth and changing
CLIMATE DYNAMICS

2765 (2014), or via changes in the uplift of dust, see P. Ginoux et al.,

Global-Scale Attribution of Anthropogenic and Natural Du.st Sources and Their Emission Rates Based
on MODIS Deep Blue Aerosol Products,50 REVS. GEON IYSICS (2012); M. Yoshioka et al., Impact of
Desert Du t Radiative Forcing on Sahel Precipitation: Relative Importance of Dust Compared to Sea
Surface Temperature Variations, Vegetation Changes, and Greenhouse Gas Wamning, 20 J. CIIMAIE

1445 (2007).
30.

Ephraim Nkonya et al., Global Extent of Land Degradationand its Human Dimension, in

(Rattan Lal &
B.A. eds., 2013).
31. Z.G. Bai et al., Proxy Global Assessment of Land Degradation,24 SOIL USE & MGMT. 223,
224 (2008) (noting that satellite-assessed normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) is
only a proxy that cannot "tell us anything about the kind of degradation or improvement,"
which requires "subsequent assessment of the actual field situation").
PRINCIPLES OF SUSIANABLE SOIL MANAGEMENT IN AGROECOSYSTEMS 203, 205

32. I.J. Wessels et al., Map)ing Land Degradationby Comparison of Vegetation Production to
Spatially Derived Estimates of PotentialProduction, 72J. ARID ENV'TS 1940, 1941 (2008).
33. Pandi Zdruli et al., What We Know About the Saga of Land Degradation and flow to Deal
ASSESSMENT, MITIGATION &
With It?, in LAND DEGRADATION & DESERTIFICATION:
REMEDIATION 3,5 (P. Zdruli, ed., 2010).
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consumption patterns continue to put pressure on existing lands
and fuel expansion into marginal lands in order to meet future
But when it comes to
food, energy, water, and material needs.
measuring the current extent of the problem, estimates of the
percentage of land degraded worldwide range from as little as
fifteen percent, to as much as sixty-five percent. 5 The fact that
estimates vary so widely is undoubtedly problematic for establishing
an LDNW goal that relies on measuring the problem and tracking
its improvement-a problem we return to in Part IV.
3. Causes
Further complexity exists in considering the causes of land
degradation. There has long been a debate over the relative
strength of anthropogenic versus natural causes of degradation, but
all seem to agree that land degradation is caused by a combination
of climatic variability-including extreme weather events and
slower climatic changes that cause the preponderance of droughts
Within this latter category,
or floods 1-and human actions:

34. ZNLD Brief, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that by 2030, the demand for food is predicted
to rise fifty percent, for energy forty percent, and for water forty percent, requiring 175
million to 220 million hectares of additional cropland); MItLLENNIUM EcOSYSTFEM
ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 1 ("The pressure is increasing on dryland ecosystems for
providing services such as food, forage, fiel, building materials, and water for humans and
livestock, for irrigation, and for sanitation."). But see Andersson et al., supra note 14, at 299
(discussing several studies that challenge "the neo-Malthusian proposition of population
density as a main driver of land degradation"); Bai et al., supra note 31, at 232 ("Comparison
of rural population density with land degradation shows no simple pattern.").
35. Technical Support Team of the UNCCD, supra note 4, at 1-2. One assessment that
further breaks down these estimates by ecosystem type finds that twenty percent of cultivated
areas, thirty percent of natural forests, and twenty-five percent of grasslands are already
degraded or in the process of being degraded. See BAI ET AL., supra note 4. Estimates
focusing specifically on drylands generally place the percentage already degraded between
ten and twenty percent. MILLENNIUM EcOSYSTEM ASsESSMENT, supra note 4, at 1.
36. See, e.g., Alexis Saba et al., Getting Ahead of the Curve: Suporting Adaptation to LongTerm Climate Change and Short-Tern Climate VariabilityAlike, 1 CARBON & CLIMNE L. REV. 3, 4

(2013) (explaining that climate variability typically references "internal climate variability"
that occurs as a result of natural internal processes within climate, as opposed to climate

change, which accounts for "anthropogenic climate change in the industrial era and in the
ftture"). The issue of how climate change factors into the causes of land degradation is
discussed infra.
37. See Herrmann & Hutchinson, supra note 29, at 539 (noting that there has been a long
debate over the anthropogenic versus natural causes of desertification); Verstraete, Scholes
& Smith, supra note 19, at 421 (noting disagreement over "root causes, characteristics, and
consequences"); see also Andersson et al., supa note 14, at 296 ("The political-ecology
approach emphasizes that land degradation results from the interaction between the
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researchers place socio-economic factors, land use patterns, overexploitation of land by pastoral and agricultural uses, removal of
vegetation, and poor water management, among other
contributing factors (including major forces like urbanization,
industrialization, and globalization) .3 As researchers have gained a
more sophisticated understanding of land degradation, they have
developed more nuanced, layered explanations of causality: there
are ecological components, direct land management components,
and social, political, and economic factors that influence and
inform land management decisions in important ways. 9 This
complexity means that agriculture or pastoralism can "play either 40a
positive or negative role, depending on how it is managed."
Causes are also highly localized and vary both within and among
ecosystem types and among communities.
Moreover, often the
difference between cause and prevention may only be a matter of
degree; for example, controlled fires may help manage land
degradation, whereas frequent and intensive fires may be a cause. 2
Then there is the confounding factor of climate change. Land
degradation certainly contributes to climate change, as degraded
land has less ability to sequester carbon. 3 Land use changes and
land degradation make up a significant portion-by some estimates
as much as twenty percent-of worldwide greenhouse gas
emissions, with forest clearing and forest degradation creating most44
of these emissions and drylands contributing about four percent.

physical environment and society."); Lal et al., supra note 23, at 9; Zdruli et al., supra note 33,
at 7.
38. ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 14; M. Seely et al., supra note 26, at 237.
39. See, e.g., Andersson et al., su pra note 14, at 297-98, 301.
40. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 9; see also Andersson et al., supra
note 14, at 302.
41. Andersson et al., sufrfa note 14, at 302.
42. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEMASSESSMENT, sujpra note 4, at 10.

43.

Grainger et al., s-ura note 25, at 363; UNEP, UNCCD & UNDD, CLIMATE CHANGE IN

THE AFRICAN DRYIANDS:

O'TIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION 38

(2009) [hereinafter "CLIMAiT CHANGE IN AFRICAN DRYLANDS"].
44. CIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICAN DRYIANDS, supra note 43, at 38.

But see Grainger et al.,

supra note 25 (noting that estimates of carbon emissions from drylands' degradation are
inaccurate and need more work). Estimates for land degradation's contribution to overall
greenhouse gas emissions vary by methodology and source. Most recently, the IPCC
estimated that agriculture, forestry, and other land-use contributed a combined twenty-four
percent of 2010 emissions. See Ottmar Edenhofer et al., Technical Susnmary, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO TIlE
FIFrH ASSESSMENT REPORI

OF THE INTERGOVERNMENIAL PANEl. ON CLIMATE CHANGE

12
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The converse is also true: although the pathways and linkages are
not perfectly understood, climate change is also a force that
contributes to land degradation. Climate change is predicted to
bring about (and in fact, is already causing) changing rainfall
patterns and more extreme weather events,45 contributing to
drought, flooding, erosion, and runoff; as well as increased
temperatures, which cause additional soil moisture lOSS. 46
Anthropogenic climate change is also responsible for some of the
large-scale changes in atmospheric circulation that influence the
including sub-Saharan
received in many regions,
amount of rain
4
48
Africa47 and southeast South America, although it is difficult to
49
confidently quantify climate change's role in this complex system.
Future climate effects vary widely by region and are not yet well

(Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wg3/ipccwg3_ar5_full.pd f [http://perna.cc/L8ZF-YDEQ].
45. IPCC, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION (Christopher B. Fields et al. eds., 2012), available at http://www.ipccwg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-AllFINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/VEU7-U2ZC].
46. CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICAN DRYLANDS, supra note 43, at 18; Lal et al., supra note 23,
at 13; Verstraete, Scholes & Smith, supra note 19, at 421; SAIIARA & SAHEL OIBSERVATORY,
CLIMATE CHANGE A.DAPTATION AND & THE FIGIT AGAINST DESERTrIFICATION 9-10 (2007)
(explaining that climate change reduces rainfall and increases variability, thereby increasing
the risks of desertification); David S. Battisti & Rosamond L. Naylor, Historical Warnings (f
Future Food Insecurity with Unprecedented Seasonal Heat, 323 SCIENCE 240, 240-42 (2009)
(predicting that growing season temperatures by end of this century in tropics and
'
subtropics will exceed the most extreme measurements from the 2 0 h century, causing crops
to stiffer); Pete Smith et al., Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU), in CLIMATE
Cl IANGE 2014: MITIGAI'ION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO THE
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF Tii.INTFRGOVERNMENTAL PANEl. ON CLIMATE CHANGE 45
FiI''ii
(Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the increase of dieback in the Amazon
region due to increased drought in the region).
47. Michela Biasutti & Alessandra Giannini, Iobnst Sahel Drying in Respjon.e to Late 20th
Century Forcings, 33 GEOI'HYSICAL RESEARCI LETTERS (2006).
48. Paula L. M. Gonzalez et al., Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: A Key Driver of Recent
Precipitation Trends in South Eastern South America, 42 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 1775, 1775-92
(2013).
49. Herrmann & Hutchinson, supranote 29, at 541-542; Rong Zhang et al., Have AelsoL
Caused the Observed Atlantic Multidecadal Variability? 70 J. ATMOSI'IERIC SC. 1135 (2013);
Nathaniel L. Bindoff et al., Detection and Attribution of Climate Change: From Global to Regional,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: TlE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP
I TO TIE FIli ASSESSMENT REI'ORTi OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(T.F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013); Wolfgang Cramer et al., Delection and Attribution o] Observed
IMPACIS, AI)APTATION, AND VUI.NERAIIITIY,
Impacts, in CI.IMATE Ci-IANGE 2014:
CONTRIBUTION O1, WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIrril ASSESSMENT REPORT OF TIlE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMNIT CHANGE (R. Leemans et al. eds., 2014).
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understood." But it is increasingly apparent that climate change
and land degradation are likely to create a detrimental positive
feedback loop, as climate change contributes to land degradation,
which releases further carbon, which in turn contributes to further
land degradation.
4. Prevention and Cure
While the extent of land degradation remains debated and its
causes confounding and complex, there does seem to be more
scientific convergence on methods to prevent land degradation
and restore degraded land. In general, most researchers point to
"sustainable land management" ("SLM") as the predominant
strategy for both preventing and reversing degradation.52 SLM is a
"knowledge-based combination of technologies, policies and
practices that integrate land, water, biodiversity, and environmental
concerns.., to meet rising food and fibre demands while
sustaining ecosystem services and livelihoods."' 5'
Practically
speaking, this might include improving the supply of soil water,
enhancing soil quality, decreasing water losses to runoff and
evaporation, protecting vegetative cover, integrating pastoral and
cropping uses of land, and water harvesting and recycling. 54 Local
and traditional practices often have much to offer in determining
appropriate natural resource management strategies. 55 These more
ecological interventions, however, are often thought not to be
enough to independently sustain improvements in land quality50. For example, outlier climate models buck the majority view on whether rainfall will
increase or decrease across the Sahel, see Giannini, Biasutti & Verstraete, supra note 27, at
125; Michela Biasutti, Forced Sahel lRainll Trends in the CM1P5 Archive, 118 J. GEOPHYSICAL
REF.SARCH 1613 (2013), and some scientists even question the consensus model projections
for the Horn of Africa. See Wenchang Yang et al., The East African Long Rains in Observationv
and Models, 27J. CLIMArE (2014).

51. See Herrmann & Hutchinson, supra note 29, at 542 ("Not only can global warming
contribute to desertification, but desertification can also contribute to global warming by
playing a role in altering sources and sinks of greenhouse gases.").
52. See Lal et al., supra note 23, at 17; Ephraim Nkonya et al., Global Extent of Land
Degradation and IlsHuman Dimension, in PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABLE SOIL MANAGEMENT IN
AGROECOSYSIEMS 221 (Rattan Lal & B.A. Stewart eds., 2013); MII.I.NNIUM ECOSYSTEM
ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 14-15.

53.

Lal et al., supra note 23, at 17; see also Chasek et al., OperationalizingZNLD: The Next

Stage, suna note 5, at 9.
54. Lal et al., supra note 23, at 17; MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at

14-15.
55. Technical Support Team of the UNCCD, supra note 4, at 5.
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many suggest that they must be accompanied by major socioeconomic changes, including improving government effectiveness,
rural services, and land tenure and rights; addressing gender
disparities; and improving access to markets and credits.5 Finally,
payments for ecosystem services are often mentioned as a potential
tool to encourage adoption of specific SLM practCes.
There appears to be greater consensus about the ability of these
strategies to prevent land degradation than to restore already
degraded land. " ' Overall, successful stories of restoration appear
limited, causing the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment to conclude
that restoration "may be difficult even with major policy and
technological interventions., 59 And, especially if greenhouse gas
emissions continue to balloon, climate change may become an
increasingly disruptive force that thwarts many efforts to prevent
and restore degraded land. As such, addressing greenhouse gas
56. Lal et al., supra note 23, at 18; Nkonya et al., supra note 52, at 221; see also Andersson
et al., sup1ranote 14, at 303 ("[A] narrow focus on technical solutions runs the risk of leading
to policy failure.").
57. See, e.g., Lal et al., supra note 23, at 19 (imagining that payments might be made by
"individuals, communities, local government, national governments or even international
institutions"); Andersson et al., supra note 14, at 306-07 (noting the rise of the concept, but
also scholars' concerns that payments for ecosystem services "may further increase the
marginalization of indigenous people through an overly narrow focus on a few monetized
aspects of the ecosystem").
58. Compare Lal et al., sup/ra note 23, at 15 (asserting that we know how to manage land
sustainably to prevent degradation, and soil can be rehabilitated and productivity restored)
with Pamela Chasek et al., Zero Net Land Degradation: Outcome of "Operationalizingthe Zero Net
Land Degradation (ZNLD) Target" Sevsion at the Sede Boqer Fourth Internationall Conerence. on
Drylands, Deserts, and Desertification, UNCCD, at 4-5 (Jan. 8, 2013), available at

http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Rio+20/DLDDSedeBoquerZNLD-out
come.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y7WZ-LM8R] (endorsing sustainable land management as a
tool for using land without degrading it, while noting that the world has less experience with
restoration tools). On payments for ecosystem services more generally, see, e.g., KAIOOMiiA
GROUP, PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERV'CI'S: GE'I-I'ING STARTIED (May 2008), availableat
http://www.unep.org/pdf/PaymentsForEcosystemServices-.en.pdf [http://perma.cc/LT3X3MZM]; Keith H. Hirokawa & Elizabeth J. Porter, Aligning Regulation with the Informational
Need: Ecosystem Sefrices and the Next Generation of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 963
(2013); J.B. RUi-iL, STEVEN E. KRAI & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLIcY O1,
EcOysI'FM SERVICES (2007); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 22.
59. MILLENNIUM ECOSSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 16; see also R.K.A. Morris et al.,
The Creation of Compensatory Habitat-CanIt Secure Snustainable Developnenti? 14 J. FOR NATURE
CONSERVATION 106 (2006) (asserting that habitat creation is much more easily accomplished

in wetlands and inter-tidal environments than it is in terrestrial ecosystems); Martine Maron
et al., Faustian Bargains? Restoration Realities in the Context of Biodiversity Offset Policies, 155
BIOLOGICAl. CONSERVATION 141, 144 (2012) (finding that restoration projects do not have a

high success rate, and that restoration is particularly challenging where "external degrading
influences" exist, such as urbanization and agricultural intensification).
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emissions will be an important component of achieving land
degradation neutrality (in addition to LDNW serving as an
important component of addressing greenhouse gas emissions).
Similarly, coordinating LDNW and adaptation strategies will be
essential to ensure that lands are protected or restored for
conditions expected in the future, rather than observed in the past.
B. From the Desertification Convention to "LDNW"
The LDNW push has come largely from the desertification policy
community. 6° Historically, desertification has been treated as a
discrete problem and governed by a series of international
conventions aimed specifically at halting and reversing its spread.
As explained below, however, the recent call for expanding the
global focus from desertification to land degradation stems from an
almost universal agreement that desertification governance has
been a failure to date.6
The primary international agreement concerning desertification
is the 1994 UNCCD. This convention replaced a looser, nonbinding "Plan of Action to Combat Desertification" agreed upon at
the 1977 United Nations Conference on Desertification. 6' The
UNCCD was ratified by 195 countries. 63 Under the UNCCD,
affected countries 4 are encouraged to submit "National Action
60. See Chasek et al., ZNLI): Outcome, supra note 58, at 3.
61. Alan Grainger, The Role of Science in Implementing InternationalEnvironmentalAgreements:
The Case of Deserification,20 LAND DEGRADAIION & DEv. 410, 411 (2009); seealsoThe 10-Year

Strategic Plan and Framework to Enhance the Implementation of the Convention, UNCCD
Dec. 3/COP.8, at 8 (Sept. 14, 2007) [hereinafter "Strategic Plan"];JeffTollefson & Natasha
Gilbert, Earth Summit:

Rio Report Card, 486 NATURE 20, 23 (2012) (giving the UNCCD an

overall grade of an "F").
62. See Rep. of the U.N. Conference on Desertification, Aug. 29-Sept. 9 1977, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.74/36 (1977); Corell, stpra note 21, at 19.
63. The UNCCD now has 194 ratifications, as Canada withdrew as of March 28, 2014
(largely for domestic, symbolic political reasons). See SECRETARIAI" TO THE UNCCD, UPDATE
ON
RATIFICATION
OF
TIE
UNCCD,
available at
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/
SiteDocumentLibrary/convention/Ratification%201ist%20May2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
G2LZ-GPFM] (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); Mike Blanchfield, CanadaFirst
Country to Pull out of
U.N. Drought Convention, GI.OIE & MAIL, Mar. 27, 2013 (quoting a spokesman of Canada's
International Cooperation Minister explaining the withdrawal on the grounds that
"membership in this convention was costly for Canadians and showed few results, if any for
the environment," while noting that Canada provided $283,000 to support the convention
from 2010 to 2012).
64. "'Affected countries' means countries whose lands include, in whole or in part,
'affected areas,"' which are separately defined as "arid, semi-arid and/or dry sub-humid areas
affected or threatened by desertification." UNCCD, supra note 1, at art. I(h)-(i).
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Programmes" ("NAPs"), which report on the extent of the problem
within the country and outline the national policy and institutional
initiatives planned to combat desertification.65 These NAPs can
then be used to solicit funding from sources in developed
countries, although the funding picture is complicated by the fact
that the UNCCD does not have its own financing tool. Instead, the
UNCCD includes a "Global Mechanism" related to funding, but its
mandate extends only to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency
For this reason, although
of existing financial mechanisms.
developed countries pledged in the Convention to "actively
support" and "provide substantial financial resources" to affected
developing countries, 67 financing of the actions proposed in NAPs
"depends mainly on the good intentions of bilateral cooperation
projects." 8 The little multilateral international financing available
is channeled through the Global Environmental Facility's land
degradation project. 69 Between 2003 and 2012, the GEF approved
96 projects under its "land degradation focal point," providing
$346 million in funding supplemented by $1.85 billion in cofinancing (including bilateral aid)."m This spending amounted to
about four percent of GEF funding between the years 1991 and
2011-certainly a disappointing result for those who believe that
healthy land is key to advancing a large variety of development and
environmental goals.'

65. See id. at art. 9.1, 10; Grainger, supra note 61, at 419-20. Developing countries are
particularly encouraged to submit NAPs, although other "affected countries" can submit a
NAP if they so desire. See UNCCD, supra note 1, at art. 9.1; seealsoChasek et al.,
OperationalizingZNLD: The Next Stage, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing the role of the UNCCD
and NAPs).
66.

See UNCCD,_upra note 1, at art. 21.

Id. atart. 6(a)-(b).
Climate Change Adaptation & the Fight Against Desertification, SAHARA &
SAHEL OBSERVATORY, 20-21 (2007); Grainger, supra note 61, at 419 (observing that NAPs
reflect limited institutional capacity and receive considerably less finding that country-level
biodiversity or climate change reports).
69. See Chasek, supra note 14, at 86-87. During negotiations, developing countries
pushed for a separate Desertification Fund within the Convention, but were unsuccessful.
The financing issue was "an almost insurmountable obstacle in the final stages of the
67.
68.

YOUBA SOKONA,

negotiations in 1994."

Bo

jelldn, The Role of the Deertification Convention in the Early 21"

Century, 40 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 146, 152 (2010). The GEF now serves as the financial
mechanism for the UNCCD, but has not proved the "panacea" to the financing problem that
many developing countries hoped it would be. Chasek, supra note 14, at 84.
70. Chasek, supra note 14, at 84-85.
71. Id. Chasek notes, however, that some additional funding reached land degradation
projects under "multi-focal" grants, although this funding is harder to trace.
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The UNCCD is a "sister convention" to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC") and
United Nations Convention on Biodiversity ("UNCBD"), as they all
emerged out of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. 72 However, the
UNCCD may more accurately be analogized to a forgotten
stepsister, given the comparatively paltry amounts of international
attention and funding it has received. During the same period that
land degradation received four percent of GEF funds, climate
change received thirty-one percent and biodiversity thirty-seven
percent.7 3 Several challenges are frequently identified as major
contributors to the UNCCD's lack of success: lack of clarity around
the concept and measurement of "desertification,
lack of high
quality scientific input and an ineffective science-policy interface 75
and lack of funding. 6 The end result is that desertification has
continued to worsen despite the nominally "urgent concern of the
international community.""

72. See Andersson et al., sufra note 14, at 305 (noting that the three conventions are
therefore often collectively referred to as the "Rio Conventions").
73. See, e.g. Chasek, supra note 14, at 85 (noting that climate change received thirty-one
percent of GEF funds from 1991-2011, biodiversity thirty-seven percent, and land four
percent).
74. There has been no evolution in the official definition used by the UNCCD since
adoption of the Convention-recent documents still define desertification as "land
degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors,
including climatic variations and human activities." See, e.g., ZNLD BR1EF, supra note 3, at 8.
This definition was, apparently, the product of a hard-fought compromise during early
negotiations. See Kjelldn, supra note 69 (2010) (noting that one of Agenda 21's achievements
was to agree on the "very difficult question" of how to define desertification). But in
practice, desertification means different things to different countries and different scientific
communities. Steffen Bauer & Lindsay C. Stringer, The Role of Science in the Global Governance
of Derestification, 18J. ENV"r. & DEV. 248, 257 (2009); Grainger, supra note 61, at 419.
75. Grainger, upra note 61; Luc Gnacadja & Lindsay S. Stringer, Towvards a Global
Authority on Desertification, and Land Degradation, 42 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 87 (2012).
76.

See Chasek et al., OperationalizingZNJD: The Next Stage, supra note 5, at 10.

See alvo

Strategic Plan, supra note 61 (acknowledging some of the UNCCD's chief flaws: "insufficient
financing compared to its two Rio sister conventions, a weak scientific basis, insufficient
advocacy and awareness among various constituencies, institutional weaknesses and
difficulties in reaching consensus among Parties"). The capacity of participating countries to
submit high quality national reports that adequately survey desertification or generate
effective solutions is another interrelated challenge facing the desertification community.
See, e.g., Grainger, supra note 61, at 419 (noting that while most parties to the UNCCD
"submit reports diligently," "quality is not high," due in part to limited institutional capacity
stemming from a lack of funding).
77. See UNCCD, supra note 1, Preamble. Of course, the UNFCCC and UNCBD are not
generally thought of as success stories, either, but they have attracted relatively greater
financing and attention.
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The widespread frustration around the lack of progress on
desertification is one of the driving forces behind the new turn
away from a narrow focus on desertification, to a broader focus on
land degradation. 7' Desertification has long been defined as "a
subset of land degradation under dry climates," 7 making the leap a
direct and logical one. And even under the reframing, as UNCCD
Secretariat publications are careful to point out, desertification
remains a key concern as a result of its scale: drylands are home to
thirty-eight percent of the world's population-over two billion
people-and cover forty-one percent of the earth's land surface."'
Nevertheless, the refocusing represents a marked change of
strategy. For a long time, the UNCCD was held up by developing
countries as "our convention"-a hard-fought international
agreement focused specifically on a predominantly developing
world problem (and one that is particularly pernicious in Africa)in contrast to the developed-country concerns of climate change
and biodiversity.
Thus, a definitional broadening, to the more
global issue of "land degradation," is not supported by all within
the desertification policy community."
Those in favor of such
universalizing defend their position on the grounds that it will
attract more international attention, more funding, and more
concrete action.
In part, this perception stems from an
understanding that climate change is likely to be a dominant

78. See Chasek et al., ZNLD: Outcome, supra note 58, at 3 (noting that it is relatively
recently that desertification became framed as a "subset" of land degradation).
79. ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 8.
80. See Uriel Safriel et al., Diyland Systems, in ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
CURR NT STATE ANI) TRENDS 625 (Rashid Hassan et al. eds., 2005), available at http://
www.unep.org/maweb/documents/document.291 .aspx.pdf [http://perma.cc/LSJK-VNYN];
see also Lal et al., supra note 23, at 9.
81. Some critics have suggested that part of the UNCCD's implementation trouble stems
from the fact that "developed countries have been reluctant to acknowledge desertification
as a global commons problem," and that this reluctance drives their refusal to commit to
substantive legal and financial obligations. Bauer & Stringer, supra note 74, at 251.
82. See UNCCD COP ll Highlights: Friday, 20 September 2013, 4 EARiTHI NEGOTIATIONS
BuLL. (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. Reporting Servs., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 23, 2013,
available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb04249e.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VR64RFSE]; UNCCD COP 11 Highlights: Wednesday, 25 September 2013, 4 EARTI NEGOTIATIONS
BuLL. (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. Reporting Servs., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 26, 2013,
available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb04252e.pdf [http://perma.cc/9QUW-

XYHC].
83. See, e.g., A STRONGER UNCCD, supra note 7, at 12, 14 (arguing that land is the "vital
natural capital resource" that unites many of the world's goals around food, energy, and
water, and that a target-setting approach will catalyze funding).
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funding priority in the coming decades. 84 LDNW, as opposed to a
focus on desertification, encompasses lands that are more carbonrich than deserts. 8 This breadth of land types potentially makes a
more compelling case for why the world should devote more of its
limited resources to land degradation prevention. 8 But at the same
time, many experts caution against fully integrating desertification
into the climate change regime, suggesting that it would be risky to
reduce land degradation to solely a matter of carbon sequestration,
given that land degradation is more widely tied to the livelihoods of
billions of people and a range of environmental concerns."'
Whether or not broadening the world's focus from
desertification to land degradation will revitalize attention and
funding in the manner hoped for will depend largely on how the
framing and implementation of this broader agenda proceeds. To
be successful, we argue, careful work needs to be done to craft
LDNW into an organizing framework with scientific and legal
accountability. The following subsection explores the work done
on LDNW to date, after which we will examine what LDNW might
learn from analogous land governance regimes.
C. The LDNW Framework, to Date
Policy-makers and advocates have already taken a few steps
towards creating an LDNW framework. Parties to the UNCCD
devoted particular attention to new avenues for progress on
desertification in advance of Rio+20 in 2012. Many saw Rio+20 "as
an opportunity to catalyze recognition of desertification, land
degradation and drought issues on the international sustainable
development agenda, raising hopes that the UNCCD could help

84. See, e.g., Grainger, supra note 61, at 419.
85. Desertification is estimated to make up about four percent of annual global carbon
emissions, due to drylands' expansive global coverage, see MILILENNIUM EcOsYSTEM
ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 18, although their carbon sequestration potential is less than
forests. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., SOIL CARBON SEQUESTRAI JON FOR IMPROVED
LAND MANAGEMENT, at 4 (2001) ("[D]rylands represent about 40 percent of the world's
land, [such that] even if the carbon content.., of drylands [is] low, they can make an
important contribution to global carbon sequestration .... ").
86. See, e.g., Grainger, supra note 61, at 425 (suggesting that perhaps proponents of
halting desertification could make more progress outside of the desertification regime,
treating the issue instead as a special case of degradation of terrestrial carbon stocks).
87. See infra notes 254-57 & accompanying text.
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the global community recognize that land policy must be
incorporated when addressing multiple environmental crises." 88
In accord with this strategy, the UNCCD Secretariat approached
Rio+20 with the request that delegates adopt a goal of Zero Net
Land Degradation ("ZNLD") by 2030.) A policy brief prepared by
the UNCCD Secretariat in May 2012 in advance of Rio +20 outlines
its vision in this regard:90 Noting that population dynamics and
increasing demand for energy, food, and water are expected to
dramatically increase pressures on the land, the brief makes the
case that land preservation is one of the most critical steps we can
take to alleviate poverty, prevent conflict, and address climate
change. 9' It paints LDNW as an achievable, effective organizing
framework, which would aspire to either avoid degradation or
offset degradation by land restoration. 2 And because the world will
also require increasing amounts of food in the future, LDNW
further requires "intensifying the yields from currently used lands
without degrading these lands, and/or without expanding the
agriculture frontier to lands that are not subject to agriculture and
pastoralism.'"9'
Although the Rio+20 conference received considerable criticism
from the environmental and sustainable development communities
for its lack of meaningful outcomes, 4 notable progress was made
The Rio+20 "Outcome Document" includes an
on LDNW.
acknowledgement of "the need for urgent action to reverse land
degradation" and a pledge to "strive to achieve a land-degradation
88. Summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Convention to
10-21 Oct. 2011, 4 EART-i NEGOTIIKnONs BUjiA . 17 (Int'l Inst. for
Combat Desertification:

Sustainable Dev. Reporting Servs., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 24, 2011, avaitable at http://
www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb04241e.pdf [http://perma.cc/WKZ7-9XTG].
89. The UNCCD Secretariat recommended several complementary steps as well in its
brief to Rio+20, including agreement on a new legal instrument (perhaps a "ZNLD Protocol"
under the UNCCD); establishment of an "Intergovernmental Panel/Platform on Land and
Soil" as a scientific and technical authority; and a comprehensive assessment of the
"Economics of Land Degradation." See ZNLD BRIEF, Supranote 3, at 24-25.
90.

Id.

91. Id. at9.
92. Id. at 12; see aLvo Lal et al., supra note 23, at 14.
93. Lal et al., sufrra note 23, at 15.
94.

ee, e.g., James Van Alstine et al., The U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development

(Rio+20): A Sign of the Times or 'Ecology as Spectacle'?, 22 ENVIL. POL. 333, 334 (2012) (noting
that the outcome document is weak on commitments or agreed actions); Ann Powers, The
Jlio+20 Process: Foruard Movernent for the Environment?, I TRANSNAT'L ENvrL. L. 403, 404-05
(2012) (explaining that Rio+20 is not generally regarded as successftul, as it lacked the broad
goals and vision of the earlier Rio conference).
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neutral world in the context of sustainable development."9 5

Of

course, the "Outcome Document" is far from a treaty with binding
effect; rather, one scholar describes it as a "statement of hopes,
aspirations, admonitions, and promises.,9 16 Nevertheless, it remains
"the kind of soft law document that can provide a basis for legal
arguments on many fronts,"97 making the Outcome Document's
embrace of LDNW an important starting point for building a viable
LDNW framework and program.
There is now a sense in the desertification community that it is
time to capitalize upon the momentum generated by the Rio+20
goal of LDNW, particularly in advance of the elaboration of the
U.N.'s 2015 Sustainable Development Goals.9 Since adoption of
the LDNW goal at Rio+20, a few expert events have focused on the
topic. During "Global Soil Week," which took place in Berlin in
November 2012, one day was devoted to exploring the concept of
LDNW.' InJune 2013, the UNCCD convened a meeting of experts
in Korea to discuss moving forward on LDNW.' 00 Experts at these
meetings have called for several next steps. The most common call
is for movement from the general goal of LDNW to more specific
targets, perhaps including the "Zero Net Land Degradation by
2030" target espoused by the UNCCD Secretariat.
Some also
suggest pilot projects in order to determine how to apply the
LDNW goal in particular areas and how to measure and monitor
success.'0 ' Finally, there is strong-but not universal-support for

95. U. N. Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June
20-22, 2012, Outconeu of the Conference, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.216/L.1 (June 19, 2012).
Summaries of the negotiations suggest, however, that delegates in splinter group discussions
were not successful in having the "zero net rate" terminology included, and that there was
also disagreement over referencing action by the international community. Summary of the
U.N. Conference on Statainable Development: 13-22June 2012, 27 EARTI I NEGOTIATIONs BULL.

15 (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. Reporting Servs., New York, N.Y.), June 25, 2012, available
at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb2751e.pdf [http://perma.cc/EH2W-9JZX].
96. Powers, sufpra note 94, at 408.
97. Id. at 410.
98. See supra note 13 for an explanation of Sustainable Development Goals.
99.

See Chasek et al., ZNLD: Outcome, supra note 58.

100.

See Chair's Summary, ConsultativeMeeting on a Sustainable DevelIment Goal (SI)G) on
(June 26-27,
2013), http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Rio+20/Chair's%20Summary%20
June%2027_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/KP9P-J6N9].
101. See Chasek et al., OperationalizingZNIl): The Next Stage, supra note 5, at 11.
Land Degradation Neutral World (IJ)NW) and on the Associated Target for ZNlI)
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including
LDNW as one of the 2015 U.N. Sustainable Development
0 2
Goals.1
However, the most recent UNCCD Conference of the Parties
("COPlI"), which took place in Namibia in September 2013,
highlighted the conceptual work that remains to be done on
LDNW. Most delegates agreed that clarification was needed to
understand the role of the UNCCD in promoting LDNW and in
moving from broad theory to implementation. The United States
went so far as to propose deleting any reference in UNCCD
outcome documents to the concepts of LDNW and ZNLD due to
"lack of clarity and scientific agreement."'03
Others proposed
proceeding with caution in expanding the UNCCD's mandate
beyond drylands 0 4 One delegate called the UNCDD decision on
how to follow up the Rio+20 LDNW outcome the "elephant in the
room" at the COP. 0 5 Ultimately, the COP decided to "launch[] an
intersessional process to examine how to define the Convention's
goals on combating [desertification and drylands degradation] in
relation to the Rio+20 outcome calling for effort to achieve a Land
Degradation Neutral World (LDNW) .'
This confusion and
disagreement over the concept of LDNW at COPI1 was in
accordance with the conclusion reached by experts at the July 2013
working group that "more clarity was needed... in defining
LDNW and the role of the UNCCD."' °7 The remainder of this
article suggests issues and lessons to consider in clarifying the vision
for LDNW.

102. The UNCCD Secretariat believes that a LDNW SDG "would provide a coherent
framework for action to safeguard healthy and productive land and soil." A STRONG.R
UNCCD, supra note 7, at 6. However, some experts questioned whether a "stand-alone target
on land [is] germane," suggesting that "land and soil issues could be adequately addressed
within the likely SDGs on poverty, water, energy and food security." United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification, Windhoek, Namib., Sept. 16-27, 2013, Outcome.s ofthe
Consultative Meeting of Experts on a Land Degradation Neutral World, at 5,

U.N.

Doc.

ICCD/COP(11 )/CRP.1 (July 22, 2013).
103.

UNCCD COP 11 Highlights: Friday, 20 September 2013, supra note 82.

104. See id. (Brazil, China).
105.

UNCCDJ COP 11 Highlights: Wednesday, 25 September 2013, 4 EARTi

NEGOTIATIONS

BULL. (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. Reporting Servs.), Sept. 26, 2013, available at http://
www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb04252e.pdf [http://perma.cc/8X9Y-N3S2].
106. Sumnary of the Eleventh Session of the Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Convention to
Combat Desertification: 16-27 September 2013, 4 EARTIi NEC FOrATIONS BULL. (Int'l Inst. for

Sustainable Dev. Reporting Servs.), Sept. 30, 2013, available at http://www.iisd.ca/
download/pd f/enb04254e.pdf [http://perma.cc/8EXE-V4DR].
107. See Chair's Summary, supra note 100, at 3.

COLUMBIAJOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:1

III. PAST EXAMPLES: WETLANDS MITIGATION BANKING AND REDD+
LDNW is not an entirely novel experiment proceeding within a
void.
Instead, it represents the latest-and perhaps most
ambitious-example of conceptualizing environmental goals in
terms of "neutrality." The following section explores two existing
land-focused programs that have utilized "neutrality" frameworks to
orient their design and administration. Before proceeding to an
overview of the two programs we have selected for comparisonthe United States' Wetlands Mitigation Banking and the
international scheme for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation-it bears explaining why we chose these
particular examples. WMB-a U.S. program that aims to achieve
"no net loss" in wetlands-presents a mature example of a
biodiversity offsetting program.
This program bears close
resemblance to LDNW in its focus on measuring and netting land
functionality. In contrast, REDD+ attempts to tackle what might be
termed a "subset" of land degradation, focusing specifically on
neutralizing global carbon emissions through improving forest
carbon sinks. REDD+ stands as a particularly valuable example of
the implementation challenges that a measurement-based,
neutrality-framed, land-oriented program faces in the developing
world.
Much has been written about each of these examples. Below, we
focus on a broad overview of conceptual and practical challenges
raised by these programs' experiences designing and implementing
a goal of "neutrality."
A. Wetlands Mitigation Banking: The First Biodiversity Offset
Experiment
Wetlands Mitigation Banking (WMB) represents an early
experiment with a class of emerging "biodiversity offset" programs.
These programs, which are "proliferating" across the world, 8 aim
to strike a balance between development and biodiversity
protection by requiring that losses in ecosystems caused by
development be offset by a concomitant restoration of habitat

108. Bruce A. McKenney & Joseph M. Kiesecker, Policy Development for Biodiversity Offsets:
A Review of Offset Frameworks, 45 ENVTL. MGMT. 165, 165 (2010); Walker et al., supra note 12,

at 149.
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elsewhere. °o Such programs are typically tied to government "no
net loss" policies, which seek to stabilize rates of habitat loss."0 The
United States, Australia, Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, among others,
now operate their own versions of biodiversity offsetting."'
The United States' WMB Program is the most mature of these
offset frameworks and the first formalized program to embody the
concept of biodiversity offsetting, thus lending itself most easily to
retrospective analysis."' As it happens, the program also epitomizes
the challenges that programs around the world have
many of
3
faced."
WMB was created not through specific legislation or regulation,
but rather sprang up more organically as way to fulfill certain
requirements in the U.S. Clean Water Act. ' 4 That Act discourages
development of wetlands by prohibiting such development in the

109. See, e.g., Maron et al., supra note 59, at 141 (defining biodiversity offsetting as
"compensating for the losses of biodiversity components at an impact site by generating (or
attempting to generate) ecologically equivalent gains, or 'credits,' elsewhere (i.e. an offset
site)").
110. Id. at 142 (noting that these programs are increasingly tied to "no net loss" policies).
111. McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 108, at 165. Brazil's program follows a somewhat
different framework than most others, in that it utilizes payments from developers to the
government instead of requiring private efforts at offsets. This payment model represents an
interesting alternative that might prove promising, but it is still in its early stages of
development. Id. at 166. A 2012 review found a total of thirty-nine active biodiversity
offsetting programs and twenty-five more under development. See Maron et al., supra note
59, at 141.
112. McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 111, at 166; Shelley Burgin, BioBanking: An
View of the Rnle of Biodiversity Banking Offets in Consenmation, 17
Environmental Scienttit
BIoDIivRsIrIY CONSERVAION 807,807 (2008).
113. See, e.g., McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 111, at 168-74 (identifying common
issues in six biodiversity offsetting programs, and Suggesting that there is considerable
consensus among the programs); Philip Gibbons & David B. Lindenmayer, Off'ets For Land
Clearing: No Net Loss, or the Tail Wagging the Dog?, 8 EcOIOGICaLu MGMT. & RESTORATION 26
(2007) (noting that poor compliance track records in offsetting programs extend beyond
Wetlands Mitigation Banking).
Early successes,
114. WMB was first utilized as an experiment on the local level.
theoretical advantages, and perhaps also the desire to "defuse the growing political pressure
for substantial change" to the system resulted in in the Corps and Environmental Protection
Agency embracing the strategy in 1995. Federal Guidance for the Establishme it, Use, and
Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 FED. REG. 58, 605 (Nov. 18, 1995). SeeJames Salzman &J.B.
Ruhl, "No Net Loss": Instrument Choice in Welland.s Protection, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 2 (Jody Freedman & Charles D. Kolstad, eds., 2006). After
many more years of experience, WMB was officially codified as a preferred mitigation
strategy in 2008 regulations. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 332.1-8. (2013).
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absence of a permit."' To receive a permit, an applicant must show
that (1) no reasonable alternatives exist to development of
wetlands; (2) the proposed development design minimizes the
harm done to wetlands; and (3) mitigation efforts will be
undertaken to restore other wetlands to compensate for
unavoidable wetlands losses.1 1' As originally implemented, these
parameters were interpreted to require "on-site" and "in-kind"
compensatory mitigation, meaning that any offsetting required by a
certain project had to occur on the same property, with the same
kind of wetlands."' The Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps"),
which administers the Clean Water Act's permitting process," ' also
interpreted the relevant regulations to create a mitigation
"hierarchy" that first favored restoration,"1921then enhancement, 20
and preservation only as a last resort option.
115. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344 (2012) (making discharge of pollutants into water illegal
except under specific sections, including receipt of a dredge and fill permit); seealso Salzman
& RuhI, "No Net Loss, " supra note 114, at 3; Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of
Trading Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland and Stream Compensatory Mitigation Markets,

36 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 230, 245-46 (2012). However, the Clean Water Act's requirements
only apply to wetlands tinder federal jurisdiction, and there is considerable controversy over
just how far this jurisdiction extends. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006);
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
116. See 33 C.F.R. § 332.1(c). These are often referred to as the Act's "sequencing
requirements," as they require, in order, first avoidance, then minimization of impacts, and
only then compensation for any unavoidable losses. See Womble & Doyle, suhpra note 115, at
246. It is worth noting that the Clean Water Act as originally passed did not contemplate
mitigation as an acceptable option-this was a later-adopted political compromise, in the
interest of not styrnying development entirely. SeeJessica Owley, The Increasing Privatizationof
Environmental Permitting,46AKRON L. Rs..v. 1091, 1096-97 (2013).
117.

Salzman & Ruhl, "No Net Loss, "sulra note 114, at 4.

118. The Corps shares its permitting authority with the Environmental Protection
Agency, which establishes standards for the Corps to apply when ruling on permits. See 33
U.S.C. § 1344(b).
119. "Restoration means the manipulation of the physical, chemical, or biological
characteristics of a site with the goal of returning natural/historic functions to a former or
degraded aquatic resource." 33 C.F.R. § 332.2.
120. "Enhancement means the manipulation of the physical, chemical, or biological
characteristics of an aquatic resource to heighten, intensify, or improve a specific aquatic
resource function(s)." 33 C.F.R. § 332.2.
121. See 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a) (2) (explaining that "restoration should generally be the first
option considered because the likelihood of success is greater and the impacts to potentially
ecologically important uplands are reduced compared to establishment, and the potential
gains in terms of aquatic resource functions are greater, compared to enhancement and
preservation"). The preference for restoration is often explained as an effort to achieve
maximum "additionality" in offsetting (a concept discussed infra with respect to carbon
emissions). The preservation option presents an additionality contindrnm, as it allows a
developer to offset wetlands development by simply preserving wetlands that, should they be
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Although the on-site program proved popular as a means of
freeing up some wetlands for development, 2 2 the project-by-project
approach "fail[ed] miserably, in terms of environmental
made creating
approach
The piecemeal
protection.' ' 23
standardized and effective offset criteria and establishing long-term
turn led to many poorly
monitoring very difficult, which
124 in
S
For these reasons, the Corps
conceived and executed projects.
began experimenting in the 1990s with "banking" as an alternative
to on-site mitigation. 2 1 Under a banking system, project developers
could purchase the wetlands offsets needed from dedicated26
wetlands bankers, rather than develop projects on-site themselves.'
Proponents reasoned that WMB would resolve many of the
problems plaguing early efforts at offsets, because it would
consolidate the locations and oversight of offset projects, create
implementation expertise, allow restoration to 27occur ahead of
wetlands development, and ease monitoring costs.
Although it has resulted in robust trading,'2 8 in practice WMB has
failed to resolve compensatory mitigation's challenges. Presidential
administrations since George H.W. Bush have pledged to enforce
the Clean Water Act in a way that ensures "no net loss" of
wetlands, 129 but the United States has continually fallen woefully

separately developed, would presumably require another developer to offset still additional
wetlands. See Maron et al., supra note 59, at 146; McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 108, at
170-71. Preservation is deemed acceptable only when it is for particularly important
resources that are under threat of destruction, and the preservation can be guaranteed to be
permanent. Id. at 171; seeaLvo 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(h).
122. Salzman & Ruhl, "No Net Loss," sufna note 114, at 5.
123. Id. at 5. See also Morgan M. Robertson, The Neoliberalization of Ecosystem Services:
Wetland Mitigation Banking and Problems in Environmental Governance, 35 GEOFORUM 361, 363
(2004); Royal C. Gardner, Money for Nothing? The Rie of Welland Fe.eMitigation, 19 VA. ENVI'I,.

L.J. 1, 2 (2000) (explaining that the failure of on-site mitigation paved the way for banking
and in-lieu fee arrangements).
124. Salzman & Ruhl, "No Net Loss, ".supranote 114, at 5.
125. Id.
126.

Id. at 2.

127.

See Womble & Doyle, supra note 115; James Salzman &J.B. Ruhl, Currencie5 and the

Commod fication of EnvironmentalLaw, 53 STAN. L. R+.v. 607, 653-54 (2000).
128. See Salzman & Ruhl, "No Net Loss, "supra note 114, at 2.

129. See Womble & Doyle, supra,note 115, at 247 (explaining that the 1987 National
Wetlands Policy Forum first made the recommendation that the guiding policy of
compensatory mitigation should be to prevent "net losses" of aquatic resource functions, and
that this recommendation was subsequently endorsed and affirmed by President George
H.W.Bush, President Clinton, and President George W. Bush).
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short of this goal."'
The biggest challenge that WMB has
encountered is that it is unable to solve the puzzle of
"commodifying" something as complex as wetlands ecology into a
tradable unit. 131 Most WMB programs use acres as a proxy for
measuring the value of wetlands, requiring a developer to offset
acres of wetlands lost by an equal or greater amount of acres
gained.13 But one acre of wetlands may provide a very different
level of actual ecosystem and habitat services than another acre,133
and there is a natural tendency for banks to acquire and restore the34
cheapest acres possible, without regard to habitat quality.
Furthermore, although banking has consolidated the locations of
restored wetlands, it has not added the incentives or monitoring
capabilities
necessary
to
ensure
robust,
long-term

130.

Salzman & Ruhl, "No Net Loss," supra note 114; Salzman & Ruhl, Cur'encies, supra

note 127, at 652-53.
131. Cf.Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies, supra note 127, at 652-53; see aLvo Walker et al., supra
note 12, at 812 (going one step further in asserting that "ecosystem services role" are not
only challenging to estimate, but are "effectively unknowable" with current levels of scientific
knowledge).
132. Acres are typically used as a proxy as a matter of expediency. It turns out to be
extremely difficult to conduct assessments that accurately and robustly measure and compare
the values of two parcels of wetlands. Thus, regulators are faced with a trade-off between (1)
designing trading methodologies that account for the many variables that contribute to
wetlands' value-which might include acreage, biophysical capacity for nutrient filtration,
floodwater retention, habitat provision, and location relative to human populations-but at
great expense and loss of efficiency, or (2) resorting to proxy measurements like acreage
that are simple to measure and monitor, but fail to capture the underlying complexities
involved. See Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies, supra note 127, at 635-636, 657-58. As a
compromise measure, some WMB administrators (the Corps has largely delegated discretion
to determine methodologies to states and local authorities) try to incorporate simple
functional methodologies into their evaluations, which are "derived from quickly and easily
observed characteristics of a wetland ... e.g., percent cover of aquatic vegetation." Id. at 658.
To compensate for what are known to be likely downgrades in quality, many administrators
also employ mitigation offset ratios that require developers to restore a proportionally
greater amount of wetlands than they destroy (for example, 2:1 or 3:1). McKenney &
Kiesecker, supra note 108, at 172.
133.
As explained thoroughly by James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl, problematic
nonfungibilities in WMB trades can arise across three dimensions: space, type, and time.
Space nonfungibilities occur because an acre of wetland destroyed in one place may provide
services to a different and/or larger population than an acre in another.
Type
nonfungibilities arise because destroyed acres may have higher ecosystem services values that
restored acres. And time nonfungibilities arise because a permit may allow destruction of
wetlands before the quality of replacement wetlands is known. See Salzman & Ruh],
Currencie, supra note 127, at 625-30.

134. See id.
at 665 ("Developers have an incentive to use the least expensive currency the
government will allow.").
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implementation.3 And finally, while banking unlocks efficiencies
by allowing mitigation to occur at locations other than on-site, it
adds a geographical complication: not only might one banked acre
not be of the same quality as the acre lost, but it also might be in a
location where the services provided by the acre are not as valuable
as they would have been at the original site."
Consequently,
studies have consistently found that although the United States has
gained in acres of wetlands since the advent of WMB, it has lost37
when it comes to "functional value" or "service provision.'
Indeed, some studies estimate that the actual amount of wetlands
impacts that have been successfully offset are as low as twenty
percent, which would indicate an eighty percent net loss in
wetlands functions.13 Thus, in terms of the end goal-preserving
environmental quality'13 9 -the United States' policy of "no net loss"
has failed, even though it may look like a success story on paper.
In response to these studies, the Corps implemented new WMB
regulations in 2008 that attempt to address some of the problems

135. While WMB requires projects utilizing preservation as a compensatory technique to
demonstrate permanence, it otherwise presumes that projects will be "self-sustaining once
performance standards have been achieved." 33 C.F.R § 332.7(b). It is not at all clear,
however, that this is typically the case. McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 113, at 172. See
aLvo Burgin, supra note 112, at 807, 813 (critiquing the WMB program's lack of resources for
implementation and long-term monitoring). Salzman and Ruhl characterize these two
problems as the "front-end" problem-"failure of instrument design," and the "back-end
problem"-failure of implementation through monitoring and enforcement." Salzman &
Ruhl, "No Net Loss,"
supra note 114, at 2. Furthermore, neither the bank nor the project
developer (the seller and the buyer of wetlands mitigation credits) has an incentive to ensure
quality of restoration, unlike in a typical market, where buyers seek out quality and sellers
stake their reputations on it. /d. at 18.
136. See Womble & Doyle, supra note 115, at 242-44. For example, population density
clearly impacts the value of certain wetlands, as ecosystem services provided near an urban
area may be more valuable because they serve a greater population. Id. at 244. This
deficiency represents the nonfungibility of space identified by Salzman and Ruhl and
discussed supra note 114.
137. Salzman & Ruhl, "No Net Loss," supra note 114, at 10-12, 22 (collecting and
describing studies reaching this conclusion).
138. James Murphy et al., New MitigationRule PromisesMore of the Same: 'Wy the New Corps
and EPA Mitigation Rule will Fail to Protect Our Aquatic Resources Adequately, 38 STETSON L. REV.

311, 316 (2009) (citing R. Eugene Turner, Ann M. Redmond &Joy B. Zedler, Count It by Acre
or Function: Mitigation Ad. Up to Net Loss of Wetlands, 23-6 NAt. W.TLANDS NEWSL. 5, 15
(2001)).
139. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R § 332.3(a) (declaring that the "fundamental objective of
compensatory mitigation is to offset environmental losses," and that projects should be
selected based on the "likelihood of ecological success and sustainability").
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identified above. 4 ° The new regulations maintain a preference for
wetlands banking' but take a "watershed approach," requiring
offset projects to occur within the same local watershed as the
wetlands destruction but relaxing strict "in-kind" requirements.'
In theory, this approach should guarantee local benefits while also
providing some flexibility in choosing the most suitable offset
locations. 4 3 The regulations also call for offset sites to be
"ecologically suitable for providing the desired aquatic resource
functions," suggesting that something more than acreage should be
used to determine appropriate mitigation efforts.14 They do not,
however, create any strict requirements in this regard. Scholars
have therefore concluded that, while the regulations
have promise,
4
1 5
application.
future
their
upon
depend
will
much
140. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 332.1-332.8 (2014). These rules replaced non-binding guidance
that had been the basis of the Corps' WMB policies from the 1990s through 2008. See
Womble & Doyle, surpra
note 115, at 257.
141. 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a) ("In many cases, the environmentally preferable compensatory
mitigation may be provided through mitigation banks or in-lieu fee programs.... "). In-lieu
fee programsallow developers to pay a fee to a local agency in place of undertaking
compensatory mitigation efforts. See Womble & Doyle, supra note 115, at 236. In-lieu fees
have been used occasionally in U.S. compensatory mitigation, with mixed success at best. See
id. at 251 (explaining that while fees are supposed to reflect estimated restoration costs,
developers are frequently under-charged in in-lieu arrangements); see also Owley, supra note
116, at 1098 (noting that at least in theory, the strength of in-lieu fee arrangements is that
money can be pooled to work on larger projects-a justification similar to one used to
promote banking); Jessica Wilkinson, In-Lieu Fee Mitigation: Coming Into Compliance with the
New Compensatory Mitigation Rule, 17 WETLAN)S EcoL. MGMT. 53, 55 (2009) ("Several

independent studies have concluded that the in-lieu fee programs [under the WMB
program] were potentially beneficial but also deeply problematic.").
142. 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(b) ("In general, the required compensatory mitigation should be
located within the same watershed as the impact site, and should be located where it is most
likely to successfully replace lost functions and services.. . ."); 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(e)(1)
(relaxing in-kind requirements by explaining only that "[iun general, in-kind mitigation is
preferable to out-of-kind mitigation").
143. McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 108, at 168.
144. 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(d)(1); but see 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(f)(1) (allowing for "a minimum
one-to-one acreage or linear foot compensation ratio" when a functional assessment is not
practicable).
145. See, e.g., Murphy et al., sufxra note 138 (concluding that although the aspirations
embodied in the rules may be commendable, it is not clear that the appropriate incentives or
mechanisms are in place for the rules to live up to their promise);J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman
& Iris Goodman, Inplementing tle New Ecosystesn Services Mandate of the Section 404 Compe. satory
Mitigation Program-A Catalyst for Advancing Science and Policy, 38 STETSON L. RiEV. 251,

265 (Winter 2009) (concluding that, "[i]n fairness, the rule probably goes as far as policy can
take the ecosystem services concept at this time-the work ahead will require a researchbased infusion of better understanding of the ecology, economics, and geography of
wetland ecosystem services at local landscape scales"). There do not appear to be any
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The design, central challenges, and disappointing results of
WMB to date are characteristic of biodiversity offsetting programs
operating across the world.16 Legal and scientific scholars alike
have expressed skepticism about the ability of these programs, as
currently designed and implemented, to counter development with
restoration in ways that achieve true "neutrality" in biodiversity
levels. Whether or not their challenges suggest that such programs
should be abolished or merely redesigned remains a topic of active
debate. "'
B. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REDD+ is the UNFCCC program focused on sequestering carbon
in forests. Addressing forest carbon harbors tremendous potential
for addressing climate change, as deforestation represents around
However, unlike
fifteen percent of global carbon emissions.' 4
WMB, REDD+ is far from an established program with a track
record to evaluate; instead, it is very much a work in progress. But
while in some ways this makes it less ideal as a case study, REDD+'s
slow evolution from theory to implementation itself offers some
important lessons for LDNW. Moreover, REDD+'s implementation
has received a tremendous amount of scholarly attention, much of
which focuses on issues also relevant to LDNW.

quantitative studies yet available on how the picture has changed with regard to "net loss"
since adoption of the new regulations.
146. See McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 108 (reviewing seven offset frameworks from
around the world to identify common design elements and methodological problems
dogging many of them); Gibbons & Lindenmayer, supi'a note 113, at 28 (finding that the
poor track record of compliance with offsets programs extends beyond WMB); Maron et al.,
supra note 59, at 143 (finding a "lack of positive evaluations of ecological outcomes" across
biodiversity offsetting programs).
147. Compare Gibbons & Lindenmayer, mupra note 113, at 26 (concluding that offsets
are a "useful policy instrument" where governments plan to allow some land clearing any
event), with Walker et al., supra note 12, at 149 (concluding that achievement of "no net loss"
policies through offset regimes is "administratively improbable and technically unrealistic");
Burgin, supra note 112, at 814 (finding that the biodiversity offsets "concept is flawed, and
decision making around offsets is largely conducted without an appropriate scientific
underpinning"); Robertson, supra note 123, at 366 ("[Tlhe story of banking ... is the story
of an extremely motivated group of capitalists using highly sophisticated ecological
arguments to catch a ride on the larger neoliberal project of expanding market relations.").
148.

David Takacs, Forest Carbon (IE.DD+), Repaing International Trust, and Reciprocal

(ontraclital Sovereignty, 37 Vi. L. REV. 653, 659 (2013). The most recent IPCC report puts this
number somewhat lower, around twelve percent, explaining that emissions from
deforestation have been falling recently. SeeSmith et al., supra note 46, at 16-17.
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The basic concept of REDD+ is straightforward: deforestation
represents a large source of carbon emissions that can be
prevented or reversed relatively cheaply, as compared to cutting
industrialized country emissions.' 5
Therefore, countries or
companies in the developed world who wish to reduce their overall
carbon emissions "footprint" may pay for forests to be preserved or
planted instead of making cuts in their own emissions. '1 0 This
desire to "neutralize" developed country emissions with developing
country forest preservation forms the underpinning and impetus
for REDD+.15
However, implementation of this concept has proven "neither
fast, nor easy.'"5 International climate negotiators first discussed
the idea of REDD during the 2005 Conference of the Parties for
the UNFCCC in Montreal, where it received wide support at least in
broad-brush form. 53 Two years later, UNFCC parties agreed to the
"Bali Roadmap," which created a timeline for the development of
an international REDD proposal. 54 REDD also became REDD+, as
UNFCCC parties agreed to include within the program not only
preservation and reduced deforestation, but also efforts to improve
forest management and enhance forest carbon stocks. 55 Since Bali,
149.

See, e.g., Arild Vatn & Paul 0. Vedeld, National Governance Structuresfor IR£DD+, 23

GLOBAL ENVIL. CI IANGE 422 (2013).

150.
REDUCE

Takacs, Forest Carbon, suvra note 148, at 655; ERIN C. MYERS
EMISSIONS

FROM

DEFORESTATION

AND

DEGRADATION

MADEIRA, POLICIES TO

(REDD)

IN

DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 9 (2008).

151.

David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, and

InternationalLaw, 15 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENVnI. L. & POL'Y 39, 41 (2009) (explaining the basic

concept behind REDD+ as the idea that northern actors can continue to grow carbon-based
economies to extent growth is "offset" by reforestation/afforestation, etc. efforts).
152. Peter J. Kanowski et al., Implementing RE1)I)+: Lessons from Analysis of Forest
Governance, 14 ENv-I.. SCI. & POL'y 111, 113 (2011).
153. See Fact Sheet: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries:
Approaches to Stimulate Action, UNFCCC (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter "UNFCCC Fact Sheet"],
availableat http://tunfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/fact-sheet-reduci
ng enissionsfrom deforestation.pdf [http://perma.cc/M8JU-TQL4] ("At the eleventh
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) (Montreal, 2005) talks on reducing emissions
from deforestation in developing countries began, with a proposal on the issue by Papua
New Guinea and Costa Rica.").
154. The Bali Roadmap is primarily memorialized in the Bali Action Plan. United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3-15, 2007, Rep. of the
Conference of the Partieson its Thirteenth Session, Held in Balifrom 3-15 December 2007, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add. 1 (Mar. 14, 2008); see also UNFCCC Fact Sheet, supra note 153, at 2.
155. See Mary C. Thompson, Manali Baruah & Edward R. Carr, Seeing REDD+ as a Project of
Environmental Governance, 14 ENVI'L. SCI. & POI'Y 100, 101 (2011); Takacs, Forerst Carbon, suna
note 148, at 658.
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and with notable progress at the 2010 Conference of the Parties in
Cancun, the international community has slowly designed and
begun to implement a framework for REDD+.5" Hopes remain
high that REDD+ can play an important role in the new climate
sustainable
regime anticipated in 2015, v delivering significant
8
development finance to developing countries.1
REDD+ activities are now being carried out by a multiplicity of
actors, with the United Nations' REDD Programme taking a
leading role along with the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
and the World Bank's Forest Investment Program.5 0 The
(FCPF) 15"'
UNFCCC encourages a three-phased approach to REDD+
implementation: Phases 1 and 2 focus on "readiness" activities,"'

156. In Cancun, parties agreed to an outcome document that delineated five acceptable
mitigation activities in the forest sector, and also agreed to include safeguards to prevent
adverse social consequences. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Caicutn, Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2010, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, field
69-70, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/
in Cancun fi]om 29 Novemhe to 10 Decembner 2010,

2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011); see atioAshwini Chhatre et al., Social Safeguard.s and Co-Benefits
in REDD+: A Review of the Adjacent Possible,4 CURRENT OPINION ENV-]I.. SUSTAINABILITY 654

(2012). The subsequent UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Durban in 2011 set up a
system to monitor safeguards, but has received criticism for leaving their national application
discretionary and for failing to develop performance indicators. Id.
157. Parties to the UNFCCC will convene for the 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris
in December 2015. At the 2012 Conference of the Parties in Durban, parties agreed that
they would adopt a new protocol or agreement with legal force during the Paris Conference,
which will take effect in 2020. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Rep. of the Conference of th. Parties on. Its
Seventeenth Session, Held in Durbanfrom 28 November to 11 December 2011,

1

4, U.N. Doc. FCCC/

CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012).
158. Il Neeff, Daniela G6hler & Francisco Ascui, Finding a IPath for REPDD+ Between ODA
and te CI)M, 14 CLIMATI. POL'Y 149, 150 (2013); Visseren-Hamakers et al., supra note 16, at
1.
159. FCPF describes itself as "a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil
society, and Indigenous Peoples focused on reducing emissions from deforestation and

forest degradation, forest carbon stock conservation, the sustainable management of forests,
and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (activities commonly
referred to as REDD+)." See About FCI1, FOREST CARIBON PARNTERIsiIP FAciLiY, https://
www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/about-fcpf-0 [https://perma.cc/FMS3-2QH8] (last visited
Jan. 10, 2015).
160. See Thompson, Baruah & Carr, supra note 155, at 101; Esteve Corbera & Heike
Schroder, Governing and Implementing REDD+, 14 ENVIL. SC. & POL'Y 89, 90-91 (2011).

161. More specifically, Phase 1 entails "developing a REDD+ strategy supported by
grants," while Phase 2 consists of "implementing a REDD+ strategy, supported by (a) grants
or other financial support for capacity building... and (b) payments for emissions
reductions measured by proxies." lFrequently Asked Questionv, UN-REDD PROGRAMME, at 2,
http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com-docman&task=doc-download&gid=1211 9&
Itemid=53 [http://perma.cc/D79F-SL6T] (last visited Jan. 10, 2015).
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while Phase 3 will deliver a "results-based" REDD+ (with funding
contingent upon demonstrated emissions reductions). 62
Most
current REDD+ funding is for readiness activities, which aim to
prepare nations to participate in an eventual international REDD+
market. Such funding takes the form of grants, concessional loans,
and technical assistance. 63 In this way, REDD+ readiness funding
conforms to the traditional model of country-to-country foreign
aid, although several multilateral funds have also been
established." 4 Readiness activities include development of national
or local capacity for land-cover change monitoring, governance
reforms, and more discrete promises like logging moratoria. 1 5 The
breadth of these targeted governance reforms suggests that "the
policy and institutional reforms necessary
for successful
66
implementation of REDD+ will be substantial."'
Significant financing has already been pledged and delivered for
REDD+ readiness activities, with donor countries and international
institutions dispensing a total of over $5 billion in REDD+ funding
to 49 countries. 67 While not yet tied explicitly to demonstrated
emissions reductions, most funding has at least been contingent on
the demonstration of "meaningful
mitigation actions and
6 8
implementation.'
in
transparency
162. See UN-REDD PROGRAMME, THE UN-REDD PROGRAMME STRArEGY 2011-2015, at 3
(2010), available at http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com-docman&task=doc-dow
nload&gid=4598&temid=53 [http://perma.cc/P4PV47XC]; see also Neeff, Gahler & Ascui,
supra note 158, at 151; Danae Maniatis et al., Financing and Current Capacity for JEDD+
Readiness and Monitoring, Measuring, Reporting, and Verification in the Congo Basin, 368
PHILOSOPHI CAL TRANSACIONS ROYAL SoCy B 20120310 (2013).
163. David Takacs, Environmental Deinocracy and Forest Carbon (REDD+), 44 ENVrI'. L. 71,
104 (2014); Neeff, G6hler & Ascui, supra note 158, at 151.
164. Neeff, G6hler & Ascui, s-upra note 158, at 150-51.
165. Cerbu, Swallow & Thompson, sura note 16, at 170; see also Neeff, G6hler & Ascui,
supra note 158, at 158-59 (detailing Indonesia's agreement to implement a logging
moratorium as a condition of receiving $1 billion in REDD+ financing from Norway, but also
noting concerns over whether the moratorium will prove enforceable); Press Release,
Publisher Office of the Prime Minister of Norway, Norway & Indonesia in Partnership to
Reduce Emissions from Deforestation (May 26, 2010), available at https://www.regjeringen.
no/en/aktuelt/norway-and-indonesia-in-partnership-to-r/id605709/
[https://perma.cc/
F2GG-3H3K].
166. Kanowski et al., supra note 152, at 113.
167.
See
VOLUNTARY
REDD+
DATABASE,
http://reddplusdatabase.org/
[http://perma.cc/F2RV-RUWR] (last visited Jan. 10, 2015) (website collecting information
voluntarily reported to the REDD+ project by either funders or funded entities); see also
Takacs, Environmental Democracy, supra note 163, at 77; Frequently Asked Questions, UN-REDD
PROGRAMME, supra note 161, at 6.
168. Takacs, Forest Carbon, supra note 148, at 690.
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In addition to these national-scale REDD+ readiness activities,
there are also many pilot and demonstration projects underway,
particularly in East Asia and the Pacific and Amazon regions, which
are occurring independently from the national-scale activities.' 69
These are implemented by a variety of actors: local communities,
private developers, government entities, or landowners.'7 These
pilots, along with the readiness activities, are intended to pave the
way to Phase 3 of REDD+, which will entail "rigorous
quantification" of emissions reductions as the prerequisite for
funding. 7 ' Such emissions reductions could be demonstrated on a
project-by-project basis, or over a larger area, such as a national or
regional-level effort to halt or reverse deforestation trends.'2
Ultimately, given the ways in which REDD+ projects may adversely
influence land use patterns beyond their immediate boundaries,
some experts predict-and many advocate for-more future
activity at national scales, rather than localized levels."7' Others
have suggested "nested" governance approaches, where state-based
measures might be integrated with bottom-up and public-private
initiatives. 1 4 How precisely such integration might occur remains
unclear, and the future permissibility of various scales of activity
may be determined by upcoming climate negotiations and/or
convergence around a particular set of measurement, monitoring,
and verification protocols, which will be necessary to ensure that
Similarly, open
Phase 3 results in real emissions reductions. 71
169.

Takacs, Entvironmental Democracy, supra note 163, at 104; Vatn & Vedeld, supra note

149, at 430 (noting that REDD+ pilots currently occurring are quite separate from national
REDD+ processes). The REDD+ Database reports a current total of 305 demonstration and
pilot activities, although the actual total could be higher because reporting is voluntary. See
VOLUNTARY REDD+ DATABASE, spra note 167; Cerbu, Swallow & Thompson, supra note 16,
at 170 (expressing concern that not many demonstration activities are occurring in Africa).
170.

Takacs, Environmental Democracy, supna note 163, at 75; see also Corbera & Schroder,

supra note, 160, at 91 ("REDD+ is rapidly morphing into a slew of unorchestrated, multilevel, multi-purpose and multi-actor projects and initiatives.")
171. Neeff, G6hler & Ascui, sujsranote 158, at 151.
172. Takacs supra note 163, at 75.
173. Vatn & Vedeld, supra note 149, at 430; Jacob Phelps, Edward L. Webb & Arun
Agrawal, Does REDD+ Threaten to Recentralize Forest Governance?, 328 SCIENCE 312 (16 April

2010) (noting that a national approach is often considered "integral to the success" of
REDD+ because it helps avoid leakage (where emissions are reduced in one location, only to
cause deforestation or degradation in another, unmonitored location), ensure permanence,
and create reliable monitoring, reporting, and verification).
174. Kanowski etal., supra note 152, at 113.
175.

Neeff, G6hler & Ascui, sufa note 158, at 151. The topic of monitoring, reporting,

and verification is explored further infra notes 188-95 & accompanying text.
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questions remain over how and when the transition will occur from
Phases 1 and 2 of REDD+ to Phase 3, where the bulk of REDD+
funding is expected to materialize. 7 ' Only a handful of countries
are currently receiving results-based financing of the type
envisioned in Phase 3.177

Even in these early stages, credits generated by REDD+ projects
can be, and are being, sold within both voluntary and compliance
carbon markets. 78 The forestry carbon offset market was worth
$216 million in 2013, with ninety-five percent of this value
transacted in the voluntary market (where demand is driven by
private sector buyers fulfilling corporate social responsibility
pledges).' 79 REDD+ credits made tip about $70 million of this
market, meaning that for the present time donor country funds for
REDD+
readiness
dwarf
private
actors'
market-based
contributions.18° Carbon compliance markets generally have tight
restrictions on the REDD+ credits that qualify,' suggesting that
176. Neeff, G6hler & Ascui, supra note 158, at 151.
177. EU REDD Facility, Implementing IREDD+, http://www.euredd.efi.int/implementingredd [http://perma.cc/A8Y6-XK7G] (last visitedJan. 10, 2015).
178. Carbon markets currently exist for both compliance and voluntary purposes.
Compliance carbon markets exist to help entities subject to a mandatory carbon cap meet
their emissions reductions obligations, and are by far the larger type of carbon market. See
William Boyd & James Salzman, The Curious Cae of Greening in Carbon Markets, 41 ENVI L. L.
73, 78-79 (2011). Examples of such markets are the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme, the northeastern U.S.'s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and California's new
Cap and Trade Program. Voluntary markets, on the other hand, serve to allow corporations
or individuals who wish to make non-mandatory contributions to combating climate change
(but do not necessarily wish to undertake their own emissions reductions) to purchase
credits through exchanges operated by various entities. See Aaron Ezroj, Climate Change and
InternationalNorms, 27J. LAND USE & ENVIT,. L. 69, 83 (2011) (explaining that there is a
significant voluntary market in the U.S. that operates with little government oversight).
Significant concerns exist about the quality of the carbon credits that are transacted in
voluntary markets. See Rowena Maguire, C1pportunitie"for Farest Finance: Cmnpliance and
Voluntary Markets, 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 100, 109 (2011).
179. EcosysTEM MARKETPLACE, COVERING NEW GROUND: STATE OF THE FoREst CARBON
MARKETS V (2013).

180. Id. at x. This funding pattern is unsurprising, given that most countries are
concentrating their efforts on broader REDD+ readiness activities. See Neeff, G6hler &
Ascui, supra note 158, at 153 (noting that "REDD+ is likely to move over time from
predictable, upfront readiness funding, with low co-funding requirements, to something
more like a market, where funders will seek to purchase emission reduction 'results' costeffectively .. ").
181. For example, the Clean Development Mechanism-the primary international
market for carbon emissions generated in the developing world-may only accept one
percent of total credits from projects in land use, land-use change and forestry, and does not
include projects aimed at preventing deforestation rather than restoring degraded areas. See
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these markets do not view many of the credits being transacted on
sufficiently reliable to be included within a
the voluntary market
82
mandatory regime.1
As REDD+ proceeds, major ideological and practical concerns
have emerged around how to best implement the program's
intended goal of carbon neutrality through developing country
forest offsetting of developed country emissions. Most significantly,
there is robust disagreement over whether REDD+ should pursue a
market-based approach; how real emissions reductions can be
assured in ways acceptable to all parties; and whether REDD+ is
capable of being implemented in ways that respect community
involvement and promote equity and justice. These concerns are
quite similar to some of the main concerns likely to be raised as
LDNW proceeds.
The first major issue REDD+ actors are grappling with is whether
or not the ultimate form that REDD+ takes should be a marketdriven regime."" There is general agreement that the long-term
goal for REDD+ is to move to something beyond foreign-aid like
assistance, but this does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that
8
a private-actor, market-driven model is the best way forward. "
KyoTo PROTOCOL 1O THE UNITED NATIONs FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMArE CHANGE,

adopted Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, art. 36, available at http://unfccc.int/essentialTakacs,
[http://perma.cc/4VRA-QAXE];
background/kyoto-protocol/items/ 1678.php
Carbon into Gold, supra note 151, at 57-58; Cerbu, Swallow & Thompson, supra note 16, at
169. Domestic and regional carbon markets even further restrict these credits; for example,
the European Union's Emissions Trading System forbids the use of international offsets
generated from land-use or forestry practices. See Council Directive 2004/101/EC, art.
lla(3)(b), 2004 O.J. (L 388) 18.
182. See, e.g., Takacs, Carbon into Gold, supra note 151, at 58 (noting skepticism with forest
carbon offsets to date, as illustrated by the fact that they are thriving as part of the voluntary
market but are not generally permitted to meet actual targets). There has also been, more
generally, considerable debate around the validity of the offsets offered in the voluntary
carbon offset markets-concerns that the World Wildlife Fund has tried to address through
the creation of "gold standard" carbon credits, which certify that the credits were produced
in a "premium" manner that should ensure additionality. The market has shown a fair
amount of demand for stch premium credits. See generally Boyd & Salzman, supra note 178.
183. Vatn & Vedeld, supra.note 149, at 422 (noting that a market-based approach to
REDD+ is controversial and comparing various governance options available at the national
level); seealso Phelps, Webb & Agrawal, supra note 173, at 312 (expressing concern that
REDD+ threatens to recentralize forest governance due to strict requirements necessary for
market participation).
184. Neeff, G6hler & Ascui, supra note 158, at 160; Chhatre et al., supra note 156, at 657
(concluding that while the international discussion around REDD+ has "endeavored to
construct REDD+ in the image of a pure market model," in reality the program is "likely to
involve complex pathways to eventual reductions in net deforestation, driven by the agendas
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Instead, there are a number of forms a results-based REDD+ might
take: in addition to a pure market approach, where buyers are
predominantly private parties and sellers are predominantly the
owners of forests, there might be national funds, run in or outside
of current national administrations, which collect international
finance money and guarantee on-the-ground emissions reductions
results; or funding might occur in the form of "conditional budget
support," where countries are awarded more generalized funding
in exchange for demonstrated results.' s' Recent research also
suggests that funding might focus more on fostering and nurturing
existing commitments and rules of sovereign governments, as many
countries have reasonably good forestry laws that are simply not

enforced. 156
In these fund-driven models, both developed countries and
private entities might supply financing, although there are
questions over whether such designs would be likely to attract as
much private finance as a pure market approach.18 ' Each of these
models has benefits and drawbacks relevant to LDNW, which are
discussed in the following section.
A second major challenge in REDD+ implementation has been
the design of robust but practicable regimes to ensure that
emissions reductions claimed from the forest sector actually occur,
and that they achieve an acceptable level of permanency. 88
"Leakage" of forest emissions-where emissions are reduced in one
location, only to cause deforestation or degradation in another,
unmonitored location-is a significant concern (and one that has
driven many of the calls for national, or at least regional, scales of
implementation). 89 Similarly, "additionality" is also of critical
of multiple actors whose interactions are governed by a suite of institutions beyond the
putative carbon market").

185. Vatn & Vedeld, supra note 149, at 422, 424. As Vatn and Vedeld note, however,
there is plenty of developing country resentment over the conditional support model, and
strict performance-based conditionalities may reduce the will of host countries to participate
in the REDD+ scheme. Id. at 147.
186. Kanowski et al., supra note 152, at 111.
187. Vatn & Vedeld, supra note 149, at 428.
188. Takacs, Forest Carbon, supra note 148, at 668 (explaining that monitoring, reporting,
and verification must be "sufficiently rigorous to be meaningful, but cost-effective enough to
be practical"); L.C. Stringer et al., Challenges and Opportunities in Linking Carbon Sequestration,
Livelihoods and Ecosysten Service Provision in Drylands, 19-20 ENVTL. Sci. & PoiiY 121, 129

(2012) (asserting that monitoring regimes should be as low-cost and simple as is feasible).
189. Alan Grainger & Michael Obersteiner, A Framework for Structuring the Global Forest
Monitoring Landscape in the IJJ)D+ Era, ENVTL. SCi. & POL'Y 14 (2011), 127- 39; see also Takacs,
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importance, meaning that developed countries want to "pay only
for changes in carbon stocks that would not otherwise have taken
place."'"" Measuring whether or not changes are "additional"
requires the establishment of baselines from whence to measure
change-another issue that has been fraught with methodological
debates. REDD+ baselines are particularly challenging because
they must measure forward-looking "business as usual"-that is,
what national forest emissions and/or deforestation would have
9'
been expected to be, in the future, in the absence of REDD+.'
These predictions are extremely hard to construct because of the
"complexity of forest-cover change" and the "sheer number of
forest-cover change drivers., 192 To help ensure that these REDD+
methodological challenges are properly addressed, developed
countries are pushing for the adoption of internationally overseen
19
monitoring, reporting, and verification ("MRV") regimes. '
Developing countries, on the other hand, want to ensure that such
international regimes do not infringe upon their sovereign rights,
though they are mindful that they must accede to a regime
94
stringent enough to guarantee the funding flows they desire.
MRV debates are also intricately linked to the question of what the
goals of REDD+ are, as MRV parameters should be designed to
195
measure performance objectives.

Carbon into Gold, supra note 151, at 58 (identifying leakage as a key challenge); MADEIRA,
supra note 150, at 11-12.
190. Vatn & Vedeld, sufra note 149, at 423; Takacs, Carbon into Gold, supra note 151, at
58.
191. Sean Sloan & Johanne Pelletier, low Accurately May We Project "rqfical Forest-Cover
Change? A Validation of a Forivard-Looking Baselinefor RJ)I), 22 GLOBAL ENVrI. CIHlANGF 440,
440-41 (2012).
192.

Id.; see also Takacs, Forest Carbon, supra note

148, at 669; Cerbu,

Swallow &

Thompson, supra note 16, at 169 (noting that baseline methodology debates have been
intense); MADEIRA, supranote 150, at 11.
193. See Takacs, Forest Carbon, supra note 148, at 720.
194. Id. at 668, 704. Measuring, Monitoring, Reporting, and Verifying ("MMRV") is
likely to require both "geospatial surveillance" and field measurements, which some
countries worry will allow outsiders to "pry into a nation's internal doings," and may also
involve "intrusive ... protections, including protections for indigenous populations and
third-party verifiers ... " Id. Takacs, however, argues that REDD+ MMRV should be
reconceived as a "reciprocal" regime that employs a "tit-for-tat" methodology to reconstruct
sovereignty, wherein Southern nations accept MMRV as a corollary to Northern financing.
Id. at 730-31.
There is particular discussion over somehow including
See id. at 668-70.
195.
"sustainability indicators" within REDD+ MRV. However, selecting such indicators has
proven challenging, as it is difficult to find comprehensive measures that are also suitable to
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This issue of just what the goals of REDD+ are brings us to the
third and most vociferous debate raised over the REDD+ carbon
neutrality framework. While REDD+ has a clear mission to reduce
carbon, most participants-and particularly developing country
participants-envision it as having more than a single-minded focus
on carbon neutrality, which would call for strategic targeting of the
cheapest, most carbon-rich forest assets. 96 Ideally, REDD+ should
facilitate a "triple win," with improved forest management
contributing to the goals of carbon reduction, poverty alleviation,
and biodiversity protection. 97 Otherwise, REDD+ risks being, in
the words of one scholar, "anti-democratic, Northern self98
interested, and human-rights impairing.'
In recognition of REDD+'s broader goals, parties to the UNFCCC
agreed in Cancun in 2010 to include an annex on REDD+
"safeguards," which parties will "promote" and "support.""' These
safeguards include commitments to make REDD+ activities
"country-driven" and consistent with "environmental integrity" and
"sustainable development needs and goals," and to support
"transparent and effective" governance structures and respect
indigenous
rights,
local
communities,
and
biodiversity
201
2
conservation. 0 While most saw this annex as a good first step,
serious questions remain over what further steps need to be taken
to guarantee full integration of biodiversity and development goals
into REDD+.20 ' Similarly, persistent doubts linger about whether
REDD+ frameworks will in practice fully respect indigenous and
local rights, including non-Western notions of property, or will
adequately embrace the participatory norms called for in the

"practical monitoring." Alan Grainger, Forest Sustainability IndicatorSystems as ProceduralPolicy
Tools in Global EnvironmentalGovernance, 22 GLOBAL ENVTI-. C IANGE 147, 148, 158 (2012).
196. Takacs, Carbon into Gold, supra note 151, at 56 (observing that REDD+ is like the

Clean Development Mechanism in this regard, which has the dual aims of promoting
emissions reductions and sustainable development).
197. Vatn & Vedeld, ntpra note 149, at 422 (noting an emphasis in the discourse over
how to make REDD+ a "triple win").
198.

Takacs, Forest Carbon,supra note 148, at 660.

199.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun, Nov. 29-Dec.

10, 2010, Rep. of the Confer-ence of the l'arties on Its Sixteenth Session, lield in Cancun linom 29
November to 10 December 2010, 69, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011).

200. Id. at Appendix 1,11 1-2.
201.
As observed supra note 156, significant criticism has been leveled at the
international community's failure to develop performance indicators for safeguards and its
decision to leave their national application discretionary.
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Cancun Agreement.2 2 These concerns are also likely to play a
central role in LDNW implementation, as discussed further in the
following section.
It remains to be seen whether REDD+ will prove the kind of
comprehensive sustainable development and environmental
management strategy desired by developing countries. Its future
will depend in no small part on the role assigned to it under the
new international climate change mitigation regime, expected to
be agreed to at the 2015 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in
203
In the meantime, however, some are hopeful that
Paris, France.
even without an overarching international REDD+ framework,
"local communities can harness the global discourse on safeguards
in REDD+ to their advantage in local and national arenas, without
waiting for an international consensus on the architecture of
That is to say, REDD+ may already be having a positive
REDD+. '
impact on national and local discourses and actions, irrespective of
the ultimate shape that the 'Phase 3' regime assumes-a type of
early benefit that LDNW developers might also want to foster.
IV. DESIGNING

LDNW FOR

INTEGRITY

In comparison to WMB and REDD+, LDNW has enormously
ambitious aims. Whereas WMB focuses exclusively on wetlands and

202. See, e.g., Visseren-Hamakers et al., sufra note 16, at I (asserting that the key question
for REDD+ is whether it can "promote synergies for a range of sustainability goals," including
not only climate mitigation but biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation and social
justice issues); Takacs, Forest Carbon,supra note 148, at 684 (observing that some early REDD+
projects diminished biodiversity by allowing for monocultures and non-native species, and
"locked up forests on which local communities depended"); Smita Narula, The1Global Land
Ruh: Markets, Rigits, and the Politics of Food, 49 STAN.J. INT'L L. 101, 112 (2013) (noting that
REDD+ has in some cases been a large-scale land acquisition driver, and that land may
"appear" available under a legal conception even when it is heavily relied upon by local
populations for sustenance); Thompson, Baruah & Carr, supra note 155 (observing that
major questions remain open about how to manage resources for carbon while also meeting
the needs of local people who depend on the same resources); Chhatre et al., supra note 156,
at 655 (claiming that the "paradox of REDD+" is that "the infusion of financial value in
forests is likely to encourage the dispossession of politically and economically marginal
forest-dependent communities"); Takacs, Fnviioninrntal Democracy, supra note 163, at 74
(arguing that meaningful local participation offers the best means of "warding off the
[potential] negative impacts" of REDD+, but finding that even the best schemes fall short in
some respects).
203. Kanowski et al., supra note 152, at 114 (observing that the future of the global
climate regime and REDD+ remain unsettled).
204. Chhatre et al., supra note 156.
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REDD+ exclusively on forests, LDNW capaciously includes all types
of land degradation within its purview. Similarly, whereas WMB
focuses specifically on preserving ecological finctions, and REDD+
at least nominally focuses on carbon sequestration,2 5 LDNW aims
to neutralize land degradation in order to advance a suite of social,
economic, and environmental policy goals. 6 But LDNW's broader
focus also suggests that a tremendous amount of knowledge might
be gleaned from each of these smaller (and still ambitious)
attempts to implement a version of land neutrality. To advance this
contention, this section highlights three major issues and suggests
how LDNW can learn from past attempts to construct a program
with scientific and legal integrity.
A. Defining and Measuring Degradation
One of the major first challenges that an LDNW framework will
need to tackle is the translation of its broad definition of land
degradation
into
meaningful
measurements-often
called
"indicators" in
institutional
parlance-that
represent
its
multifaceted goals. As both WMB and REDD+ illustrate, the way
that the scientific/social problem at issue is translated into legal
terms has profound impacts on what is considered as "success" and
how well this accords with a program's original aims.
In its current conceptual form, LDNW leaves major decisions
over the definition of "land degradation" unarticulated.
But
definitional fuzziness, which has already proven a challenge in the
implementation of the UNCCD,
will prove considerably more
problematic in a regime committed to "neutralizing" degradation,
as the concept necessarily implies a netting of all losses and gains.
Land degradation's current definition includes "reduction or loss
of the biological or economic productivity and complexity of
[land]."""2 Such a capacious definition assists in uniting parties with

205. As noted above, there is strong pressure, and some basic international agreement at
least in principle, that REDD+ must also work to promote sustainable development, poverty
alleviation, biodiversity conservation, and participatory processes if it is to have real
legitimacy and success. See supra notes 196-202 & accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., A STRONGER UNCCD, supra note 7, at 3 ("Land and the fertility of its soil
are critical natural capital essential for sustainably ensuring food, renewable energy and
water security while eradicating rural poverty, conserving terrestrial biodiversity and building
the resilience of our agricultural systems to climatic shocks.").
207.

See supra note 74.
BRIEF, supra note 3, at 6.

208. ZNLD
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potentially different driving concems-biodiversity loss, ecosystem
preservation, economic development, etc.-but it may well detract
from the program's ability to measure degradation at a level of
specificity acceptable for establishing progress towards neutrality.
One initial question regarding land degradation measurement is
whether degradation should be made into a binary concept that
allows land to be categorized as either "degraded" or "not
degraded" for netting purposes. If so, much nuance will be lost in
the translation, given that land may be in various stages of
degradation, with severe degradation of more concern than mild.
If a binary framework is rejected, considerable complications will
arise regarding how various degrees of degradation and restoration
are factored into an overall measure of "neutrality."
REDD+ has skirted this problem in part by focusing its neutrality
framework specifically on carbon, a single variable where "a ton is a
ton" 20 9 and forests are labeled by their strength as "carbon
repositories., 201 In this way, degrees of forest degradation obtain an
objective scientific measure. In contrast, WMB has had to confront
head on the complicated question of assigning degrees of value to
wetlands, and it has struggled to do so. 1' Some WMB practitioners
have developed algorithms that use "easily measured site
characteristics to make inferences about harder-to-measure
'wetland functions,"' turning these into numeric scores that rank a
• 212
wetland's value.
But even within this single domestic program
focused exclusively on wetlands, use of these more rigorous systems
to attempt to rank various parcels of land has been spotty, and
wetlands have mostly been traded on the basis of acreage because it
serves as a cheap and easy proxy.1 3 As this experience suggests,
LDNW will want to think carefully about whether and how to
define degradation either in shades of black and white or along a
spectrum that is meaningful without being overly onerous.
209. Salzman & Ruh1, Currencies, supra note 127, at 665.
210. Takacs, Forest Carbon, supra note 148, at 728. However, given the debate discussed
supra over whether REDD+ needs to more explicitly incorporate biodiversity and livelihood
goals into its measures of success, it too could face more challenges in measuring forest
quality in the future. See Visseren-Hamakers et al., supra note 16, at 5 (suggesting that "a new
definition of REDD+ success may be necessary, incorporating climate, biodiversity and
livelihoods goals instead of only focusing on reducing carbon emissions" (internal citation
omitted)).
211. See supra notes 131-139 & accompanying text.
212. Robertson, supra note 123.
213. Id.
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More fundamentally, additional definitional clarity will be critical
to understanding how land is to be measured and classified in an
LDNW scheme. As a starting point, more precision on the goals of
land degradation neutrality is important. Ongoing REDD+ and
WMB debates about the goals of those programs suggest that early,
frank discussion of program goals should ideally underpin legal
definitions and frameworks, and that failure to reach early
resolution on these issues is likely to lead to implementation
controversies down the road.2 1 Moreover, in the case of WMB,
selection of inappropriate proxies to serve as the measure of
program success has done more than merely stir up controversy: it
has caused a program that appears successful on paper in terms of
achieving "no net loss" to fail on the true goal of delivering
functionally equivalent wetlands. 5
There have already been myriad efforts to define and quantify
land degradation, but as one recent critique described:
Most of these studies have focused on deforestation, overgrazing,
salinization, soil erosion, and other visible forms of land degradation
rather than on the degradation of less visible characteristics of soils
(e.g. carbon content, top soil depth, etc.) or the less direct
consequences of land degradation such as human suffering and the
loss of ecosystem services.
These discrete scientific measurements stand in contrast to the
broad goals articulated in documents setting forth the LDNW
vision, where land is presented as a "nexus issue" uniting concerns

214.

As explored supra, REDD+ has engendered considerable controversy during early

stages of implementation due to its focus on carbon storage potential as the primary measure
of success, which parties have attempted to remedy through the addition of later
"safeguards" adding what many hope will be complementary goals of equity, community
participation, biodiversity protection, and poverty eradication. For some, this conversation
around broader goals happened far too late. See, e.g., Visseren-Hamakers et al., supra note
16, at I (suggesting that rather than framing REDD+ in terms of "safeguards" and "cobenefits," it should instead have three "pillars" of carbon, biodiversity, and community).
Similarly, WMB has suffered from a lack of clear legal expectations that functionality, rather
than acreage, be the relevant metric for determining whether "neutrality" has been achieved.
See Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies, supra note 127, at 635-36, 657-86; McKenney & Kiesecker,
sufrra note 108, at 172.
215. Murphy et al., supra note 138, at 316.
216. JOACHIM VON BRAUN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF LAND DEGRADATION 9 (2012),
avaikble at http://www.zef.de/fileadmin/webfiles/downloads/projects/ELD/ELD_Isstie_

paper_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BEV-ZVQV].
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around energy, food, water, climate, and biodiversity. 27 LDNW
enshrines the diverse objectives of both agricultural intensification
To encompass this
and preservation of non-agricultural lands.2'
diversity, LDNW program design will have to reach some level of
consensus over how to balance these goals. Moreover, LDNW's
expansive social and environmental objectives suggest that
attention should be paid at the definitional phase to distributional
equity and ensuring that LDNW works to the benefit of local
of
REDD+'s
some
address
proactively
to
populations
controversies. 2' 9 The ongoing process of selecting "indicators" to
serve as measurements for the state of desertification under the
UNCCD may provide a helpful departure point for this
conversation.2 20 The UNCCD indicators combine more ecological
units (e.g., "proportion of change in each land use category to
another per unit of time," and "biodiversity condition of a region
relative to a 'pristine' state") with explicit measures of poverty
("proportion of the population in affected areas living above the
poverty line") and other measures of development (e.g., the
Human Development Index as a measure of "approximate status

217. See, e.g., Technical Support Team of the UNCCD, supra note 4, at 2-3; ZNLD BRIEF,
svpra note 3, at 9 ("Land is central to the 'nexus' that links energy, food, water and
environmental health in an interdependent loop.").
218. ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that increased food, energy, and water needs
will "require 175 million to 220 million hectares of additional cropland"); Chasek et al.,
ZNL1): Outcome, supra note 58, at 3 (arguing that humanity cannot afford to increase arable
land and must instead increase the productivity of land currently tinder use while restoring
degraded land); see also Lal et al., supra note 23, at 23. The problem of conversion of
agricultural lands in the developing world into biofuels production rather than food
production might be relevant to considerations of the extent to which agricultural yields
should be used as a proxy measure of land that is serving to advance the goals of sustainable
development. See, e.g., ROBERT HOWARTII El' AL., RAPID ASsESSMENT ON BIOFUELS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: OVERVIEW AND KEY FINDINGs 4 (2009) ("The rapidly growing production of
biofuels requires additional cropland. In some cases, this additional land comes from
agricultural land previously used to grow food or feed crops. In a hungry world, these
diverted crops must be made up elsewhere, thus driving land conversion-perhaps in
different countries and on different continents-to compensate for the loss of food-crop
production. Additional land for food and feed production usually comes from the
conversion of native ecosystems such as grasslands, savannahs, and forests, or by returning
permanent fallow or abandoned croplands to production.").
219. Cf Chhatre et al., supra note 156 (listing potential concerns with REDD+ including
land grabbing and maldistribution of benefits, and suggesting that ensuring land tenure
security within the REDD+ regime will be a key to minimizing risks to local people).
220. See BARRONJ. ORR, SCIENTIFIC RI.VIFW OF TI-E UNCCD PROVISIONAILYAcCIPTED SET
OF IMIFACT INDICATORS TO MIEASURE [II EIMPLEMEN'I'ION OF STRITEGIC OIIECTIVES 1,2 AND
3 (2011).
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and change in the wellbeing of populations") .2' However,
reaching agreement on these desertification indicators was a long,
fractious process and fill implementation of these measurements
still appears years away.'222 To expedite a similar process for LDNW,
one way forward might be to develop a simpler set of universal
indicators that all regions and countries will use, and then allow
flexibility in selecting additional regionally specific ones, at least in
early stages of implementation. Such a strategy would avoid the
need for worldwide consensus on a set of complete measurements
and allow for experimentation as to what measures best ensure
success.
The definitions and measurement "indicators" selected for land
degradation will filter into the next critical step for the success of
an LDNW framework, which has proven an Achilles heel of
desertification policy and REDD+ to date: establishing baselines
from whence the rate of change can be measured. 23 As in REDD+,
baselines will be scientifically challenging to assess, because they
will necessarily require parsing persistent degradation from
temporary fluctuations. And frustratingly, the more LDNW is able
to encapsulate its broad goals within its measurement of success by
choosing a robust set of social and economic indicators of land
degradation, the harder the problem will then become to quantify
and measure. 4 Similarly, as with REDD+, questions are sure to
arise over the extent to which baseline methodologies should be
universal or tailored to regional or national situations.
These
challenges will not make the process an easy one, and likely any
221. Jd.at9-10.
222. As Dr. Orr describes in more detail, work developing indicators for the UNCCD has
been ongoing since 1998. Id. at 10. See alooJeff Tollefson & Natasha Gilbert, Earth Summit:
Rio Rq)ort Card, 486 NATURE 20 (2012) (giving the UNCCD a grade of "F" and explaining
that it took the desertification community until 2009 to agree on a set of 11 "impact
indicators" to measure progress on desertification, and that even submitting data on two of
these, as required in 2012, would be tough for some participating countries).
223. See M. Akhtar-Shuster et al., Improving the Enabling Environment to Combat Land
Degradation: Institutional, Financial,Legal and Science-Policy Challenges and Solutions, 22 LAND
DEGRADATION & DEV. 299 (2011) (observing that efforts to combat land degradation have

been hampered to date by insufficient national-level monitoring and reporting). Within
REDD+, forest degradation has also proven harder to measure than deforestation-a
harbinger of some of the challenges LDNW may face in defining and measuring land
degradation. See MADEIRA, supra note 150.

224. Cf Grainger, supra note 195, at 158 (noting the difficulty of finding comprehensive
indicators also suitable to "practical monitoring").
225. MADEIRA, supra note 150, at 11.
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methodologies selected will remain susceptible to some criticism.
Nevertheless, to bolster accountability and attract funding,
considerable emphasis should be placed on the establishment of
scientifically defensible, even if imperfect, baselines worldwide as a
critical first step in LDNW. Again, universal guidelines coupled
with regional experimentation may provide an early path forward
that maintains integrity without requiring unanimity at a stage
where it may be detrimental to progress.
Beyond definitional and baseline concerns, WMB and REDD+
are also instructive on the issue of designing MRV regimes. To
attract international finance, LDNW will need to follow REDD+'s
efforts to construct a "good enough" MRV scheme; that is, one that
satisfies the stringency criteria of international donors, while not
proving so intrusive or expensive as to preclude its adoption by
countries, localities, or project developers. 26 In the case of LDNW',
the MRV effort will have to include finding new ways to inject rigor
into measuring progress on land degradation, in order to supply
the accountability that the desertification regime has lacked to
date.22 1
WMB's troubled experience in securing long-term
monitoring, combined with REDD+ concerns over permanency,
also suggests that MRV scheme designers should think up-front
about ways to emphasize long-term accountability in MRV
processes. 228
Designing pilot programs where finding is
incremental and contingent upon certain demonstrated milemarkers of success might aid in determining how to successfully
incentivize long-term LDNW MRV.
One further point worth
noting is that LDNW's MRV need not necessarily be as exacting as
REDD+'s, if the program is not intended to facilitate compliance
with international carbon regimes, so long as MRV tracks

226. See Takacs, lErevt Carbon, suprea note 148, at 668 (suggesting that the key for REDD+
MRV has been to construct a regime "sufficiently rigorous to be meaningful, but costeffective enough to be practical").
227. See, e.g., Stringer et al., supra note 188, at 121 (noting that desertification has
suffered from a lack of accurate accounting models, including deficient data and a lack of
appropriate local monitoring methods or regional protocols). Cf Takacs, Faresvt Carbon, supra
note 148, at 673 (noting that funding for REDD+ hinges on MMRV that accurately measures
deforestation and reforestation rates).
228. SeeMcKenney & Kiesecker, su[ra note 108, at 172 (WMB); Burgin, suILra note 112, at
807, 813 (WMB); Takacs, orest Carhon, sntpra note 148 (REDD+).
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reasonably well those measures that are important to the program's
success.

229

In sum, the experiences of both REDD+ and WMB suggest that
early, inclusive conversations over the purposes driving a neutralitybased land preservation scheme are critical to creating a program
able to transform social and environmental goals into meaningful
legal frameworks backed by best available scientific knowledge.
Program aims must filter down into definitions, measurements, and
monitoring schemes in order to achieve not just compliance but
on-the-ground success. If LNDW is able to have productive early
conversations and reach an acceptable level of basic consensus on a
design that will ensure integrity of the worldwide goal, balanced by
regional flexibility where appropriate, it can hopefully avoid some
of the lengthy implementation challenges facing REDD+, as well as
WMB's failure to deliver on its "no net loss" goals.
B. "Neutrality" as an Organizing Principle
Several particular challenges arise with LDNW's focus on
"neutrality," that is, the offsetting of land degradation losses with
equivalent land restoration gains. 230 We use "offset" here broadly,
not intending to refer specifically to market-driven regimes, but to
a program that relies on measuring losses against gains as its means
of assessing performance. 231 In this way, LNDW closely resembles
the structure of WMB, which is similarly organized around a "no
net loss" goal.
In contrast, REDD+, although espousing a
"neutrality" framework that permits developed country donors to
claim credit for developing country forest carbon, differs somewhat

229. See infra Part IV.C.2 for a more detailed discussion of LDNW and carbon regimes.
Note that REDD+'s MRV is also expanding beyond mere carbon accountability, with many
exploring how the REDD+ MRV program can also be used to measure other indicators of
performance, including governance reforms, development benefits, and human rights
adherence. See Takacs, Forest Carbon, supra note 148, at 670. In this way, REDD+ MRV may
prove a useful model for LDNW.
230.

See UNCCD, Global Conference Steps up Action to More to a Land-Degradation Neutral

World (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.unccd.int/en/media-center/MediaNews/Pages/
highlightdetail.aspx?HighlightlD=145 [http://perma.cc/D4JK-L7M8].
("Land-degradation
neutrality refers to a global shift in land stewardship such that degradation of new areas is
avoided, and unavoidable degradation is offset by restoring an equal amount of already
degraded land in the same time and in the same ecosystem.")
231. See R.KA. Morris et al., supra note 59, at 107 (observing that offsets can take a wide
variety of shapes, and may or may not include a market component like banking as an
"extension" of the program).
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in that it does not set a "no net loss" of forests goal. It is the special
challenge of no net land loss goals that we probe in this section.
The first challenge of a "no net" program is that a certain
measure of "equivalence" is embedded in the concept of land
offsets that is extremely hard to achieve in practice.232 As WMB and
other biodiversity offsetting schemes show, there is an inherent
tendency in any offsetting scheme to replace higher-value land with
lower-value land, and real difficulty in creating the kinds of longpersists. 33
term incentives that will ensure that restoration
Accordingly, even if LDNW does not adopt the kind of marketbased trading program that WMB embodies, there will always be
questions of whether land lost to degradation is, as a matter of
scientific integrity, being counterbalanced with equal parcels of land
To
being restored, even when paper compliance is achieved.
complicate the picture, some recent research suggests that given
the challenges of achieving "equivalency," no net loss may be the
wrong focus; focusing on achieving certain priorities maybe a more
cost-effective way to determine what parcels of land should be used
for offsetting. 21 This point underscores the importance of creating
robust definitions and MRV regimes that capture the most essential
qualities that the LDNW program seeks to protect, as a way to
guard against the almost inevitable erosion in value that will occur
of any land characteristics that are not embedded within the
scheme's measurement and MRV systems.
A "no net loss" structure also raises questions about the balance
to be struck between preservation and restoration. To be "land
degradation neutral" suggests indifference to whether land is
preserved or restored, so long as restoration keeps pace with
But several factors should make us wary of
degradation.3 '
constructing a legal framework that endorses this indifference.
The first is the tendency noted in the previous paragraph for
functional value to be lost when certain degraded parcels are

232. Maron, supra note 59, at 141.
233. See, e.g., James Murphy et al., supra note 138, at 17-18 (observing that in the WMB
program, banking sites tended to be in inexpensive areas, potentially far from the area where
actual wetlands impacts were being lost, and that monitoring was of questionable quality).
234.

See T.J. Habib et al., Economic & Ecological Outcomes of Flexible Biodiversity Off t System.,

27 CONSERVNIION BIOLOGY 1313, 1313 (2013).
235. Cf Sandra Brown & Daniel Zarin, What Does Zero Deforestation Mean?, 342 SCIENCE
805, 805 (2013) (asserting that net deforestation targets "inherently and erroneously equate
the value of protecting native forests with that of planting new ones").
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"offset" with the restoration of others. This tendency suggests that
in most cases, halting the initial degradation would have been more
beneficial
than
permitting
degradation
accompanied
by
restoration. The second factor that calls into question a program
that imbeds no preference for preservation over restoration is the
scientific challenge, discussed in Part II, of actually restoring
degraded land. Scientists are much more confident in the ability of
certain land management practices to prevent degradation than
they are of their ability to restore degraded land .
All of these
factors suggest that perhaps a premium should be put on
preservation-a premium that can be lost in a "no net" scheme like
37
LDNW

.

LDNW's "no net degradation" focus combines with the breadth
of its scope to raise another important question: because it covers
multiple land types and demands neutrality within each of these,3
is the aim of LDNW to preserve each of these land types in
precisely the quantities in which they now exist? Climate change is
likely to prove a confounding factor that may make this goal
impossible in many regions. As the earth continues to warm, many
regions will naturally23 9 evolve to have a different mix of ecosystems
than they currently do-for example, the tropics are likely to get
236.

See Katharine Suding, Tmard an Era of l&vtoration in Ecology: Successes, Failurev, and

Opportunitie"Ahead, 42 ANN. REV. EcOLOGY, EVOLULTION, & SYSTEMATICS 465, 469-70 (2011)
(noting that restoration is unlikely to result in "complete recovery," making compensation
programs challenging because "future gain is uncertain whereas the immediate loss is
permanent"). It is also the case that some ecosystems recover better than others. See Maron,
suna note 59, at 144. This difference among ecosystem types is another factor that might
suggest the advisability of disaggregated targets by both preservation/restoration and land
types.
237. On the other hand, if a legal baseline exists that requires anyone intending to
degrade certain parcels of land to offset their actions with restoration, as in WMB, then a
preference for restoration does make more sense, as preservation is essentially the default.
See supra note 121 (explaining that WMB's preference for restoration is an effort to achieve
maximum "additionality," since there is essentially a baseline of preservation presumed
under the Clean Water Act's prohibition on infilling wetlands without a permit). However, a
broad "no degradation" baseline is unlikely to exist or be enforceable in many countries, as
evidenced by the world's poor track record to date on preventing degradation.
238.

Cf UNCCD, Global Conference Steps up Action to Move to a Land-Degradation Neutral

World supra note 230 (envisioning neutrality as requiring unavoidable degradation to be
offset by "restoring an equal amount of already degraded land in the sane time and in the
sameecosysten" (emphasis added)).

239. At least, "naturally" inasmuch as it will be climactic rather than on-the-ground forces
at work in changing the mix of land types, although it is now well established that
anthropogenic forcing is the dominant cause of these climactic changes. See Smith et al.,
supra note 46, at 45.

2015]

Integrity in Advancing "Land Degradation Neutral World"

89
2 40

drier, while in the far north, frozen tundra is expected to shrink.
It therefore might be a fool's errand to try to restore and maintain
particular ecosystems at their current levels of productivity and
expansiveness in the face of forces beyond local or national
control.
Regional variability highlights the broader challenge of
geography.2 4' The goals of LDNW will not be accomplished if the
whole of Africa sees severe land degradation, but Latin America
achieves equal land restoration.2 42 Thus, as with WMB, LDNW will
have to select appropriate geographical boundaries within which to
net gains and losses. Based on the particularities of the WMB
scheme, the Corps chose in its refined version of WMB to
emphasize a "watershed" approach to "no net loss," instructing
(though not commanding) that offsets should occur within the
same watershed as the wetlands lost.2 4 3 Similar discussion will need
to take place in LDNW as to appropriate geographic areas over
which to net out progress. At the same time, REDD+ offers a
different important tale regarding geography, which is that
international financing is likely to flow to those countries best
equipped to deliver and document results, which is a different set
of countries from those that most need assistance in preserving
their forests.244 Creators of the LDNW framework will also want to
think carefully about how the scheme can be designed to maximize
the fair distribution of benefits and funding worldwide.
These complexities lead us to a suggestion that has been made in
other contexts that LDNW might be wise to import245: encouraging

240. See id. (predicting moderate risk of die-back of tropical forests due to prolonged
drought in South America, with lower risk of the same in African and Asian tropical forests).
241. See generally Womble & Doyle, sulra note 115.
242. Cf id. at 424 (observing, with respect to WMB, that a "no net loss" program
"inherently requires specification of an ecologically and socially appropriate scale at which
losses and gains of wetlands and streams will be balanced," as it would do no good for the
U.S. to achieve no net loss of wetlands but deplete entire regions of their wetlands in the
process).
243. Id. at 259. However, even the term "watershed" will lead to major variations in scale
across the United States, as watersheds depend topography and can vary greatly in size. Id. at
261.
244. See Visseren-Hamakers et al., supra note 16, at 4 (noting that REDD+ has distributive
dimensions and that the scheme should be designed to ensure that REDD+ financing
actually reaches the poor).
245. See Brown & Zarin, supra note 235, at 805 (suggesting that in place of certain timebound targets for achieving "zero deforestation," it would be better to set separate targets for
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the establishment of separate preservation and restoration goals,
particularized to the appropriate scale. Under the broad rubric of
ensuring no net degradation, LDNW might encourage regions,
countries, or localities to assess their land use patterns and history
in order to determine what the appropriate mix among ecosystems
and between preservation and restoration is for a given locale.
Then, the relevant entity could set appropriate, disaggregated
targets for restoration and preservation.
In this way, LDNW
might achieve worldwide neutrality in land degradation when
targets are amalgamated, without actually implying a potentially
indefensible indifference to whether or where land is preserved or
restored.
C. Administering LDNW
In this final subsection, we derive suggestions for how to
administer a global, land-focused neutrality program like LDNW
from WMB and REDD+. Three tensions predominate:
the
appropriate scale of projects, the role of the private sector, and the
challenge of mobilizing funding.
1. The Scale of Projects
LDNW is framed as a global target, but with recognition that it
will need to be broken down into somewhat smaller pieces,
whether regional targets, national targets, or targets that are even
more localized. In determining how to proceed, debates over scale
similar to those that have driven discussion of the REDD+
architecture are likely to arise. Perhaps even more so than in the
forest context, land degradation policymakers have increasingly
come to understand that both the causes and solutions to land
degradation are highly localized, and to place a premium on local
and traditional knowledge. But in the case of REDD+, many have
reductions in clearing of native forests (gross deforestation) and increases in the
establishment of new forests (reforestation)).
246. Cf id. at 807 (suggesting place-based deforestation targets that take into account
current characteristics). One downside of this suggestion is that measuring preservation of
land from degradation will undoubtedly face many of the same thorny challenges that
REDD+ has in determining appropriate baselines that project what degradation othenvive
would have been in the future, absent policy intervention, in order to ensure additionality. See
supra note 191. Nevertheless, it seems ill advised to let measurement challenges dictate an
embedded preference for the inefficient and less effective strategy of restoration over
preservation.
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expressed concern that the decentralization trend that has
predominated forest governance more recently may be reversed by
the push for national-level policies, which have the advantage of
better preventing leakage and thereby enhancing efficacy. 47
Similar leakage concerns within an LDNW framework are likely to
counsel against a highly localized strategy, as focusing on
neutralizing degradation in one locality might have the undesirable
consequence of causing land in neighboring, non-participating
localities to face steeper degradation pressures.248
Accordingly, LDNW is likely to experience the same tension
REDD+ has between local, participatory solutions capable of
accomplishing multiple sustainable development objectives and
protecting local populations from exploitation, and the desirability
of national accountability frameworks.249 One possible direction
forward for LDNW, suggested by the REDD+ experience, is to
embrace the kind of pluralistic experimentalism that has propelled
REDD+ forward in the face of this tension. As described above,
REDD+ has allowed national- and local-level efforts to proceed in
tandem, with the intention of possibly harmonizing these into
some sort of "nested governance" approach down the road.250
While this strategy offers little in the way of certainty, it might allow
for much-needed experimentation on the question of what types of
LDNW governance are likely to prove successful. At the same time,
LDNW drafters might consider early adoption of international
guidelines on local participation rights, to ward off later tensions
around issues of decentralization and distributional equity."

247. See Phelps, Webb & Agrawal, supranote 173, at 312 (noting that a national approach
is often considered "integral to the success" of REDD+ because it helps avoid leakage, ensure
permanence, and create reliable MRV, but that it also makes national governments the
primary forest stakeholders).
248. Cf supra notes 119-24 & accompanying text (explaining that WMB also evolved out
of an effort to end project-by-project wetlands restoration dte to a perception that it was less
effective and more difficult to manage and monitor).
249. Cf Takacs, Environrmental Democracy, supra note 163, at 74 (arguing that local,
meaningful, informed participation offers the "best means of warding off the [potential]
negative impacts" of REDD+); Herrmann & Hutchinson, supra note 29, at 550 (observing
that most African countries are moving to a "bottom-up approach" to combating
desertification, but that such approaches are "more difficult to reconcile with the terms of
bilateral and multilateral funding than their top-down counterparts").
250. See Kanowski etal., spranote 152, at 112.
251.
Cf Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, supra note 173, at 313 (noting that early REDD+
readiness applications did not adequately address issues of decentralization); Takacs,
Environmental Democracy, s'upranote 163, at 130 (suggesting that in order to ensure
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2. The Private Role
Proponents of LDNW insist that it is not "a rationale for marketbased offset or compensation schemes.2 52 Nevertheless, LDNW will
inevitably face the same tensions as WMB and REDD+ over the
extent to which the program is to involve public versus private
actors.
It seems unlikely that LDNW will evolve to have the same
sort of compliance market that predominates in WMB and is
anticipated to ultimately predominate in REDD+, unless it were to
pursue the strategy of trying to integrate into the international
carbon marketplace.
This option is frequently discussed,24
although it presents major hurdles due to (1) the fact that forests
contain far more carbon than other land types; 5 (2) the challenges
of precisely measuring carbon sequestered over the long term
through sustainable land management techniques rather than in
the more tangible medium of trees; 256 and (3) the risks associated
with reducing land degradation management to a carbon
reduction strategy alone, when it is intended as a broad livelihood251
enhancing measure.
On the flip side, carbon markets provide a
appropriate local participation and benefits from REDD+, all local communities might start
with a "community protocol" that is a working agreement setting forth how participation will
proceed, how local norms/customs will be respected, and what the local understanding of
land use patterns and land tenure are).
252. A STRONGER UNCCD, supra note 7, at 9.
253.

See Chasek et al., Operationalizing ZNL1):

The Next Stage, supra note 5, at 10

(describing the need for strong partnerships between the public and private sectors to fund
ZNLD and LDNW initiatives).
254. See, e.g., Cerbu, Swallow & Thompson, supra note 16, at 169 (noting that REDD+ is
spurring movement towards including "net negative changes in carbon stocks across all lands
and land uses" within future international compliance mechanisms); Visseren-Hamakers et
al., supra note 16, at 4 (noting complex tensions over whether to broaden REDD+ beyond
forests to include agriculture).
255. Takacs, Carbon into Gold, su/na note 151, at 56 (noting that "half of the global
terrestrial pool of carbon is stored in forests").
256. Many have expressed skepticism as to whether the complex type of management
regimes necessary to treat desertification could lend themselves to the strict monitoring,
reporting, and verification procedures of carbon markets (similar to the problems that
REDD has faced). See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICAN DRYIANDS, sutpra note 43, at 43-44
(noting that "[c]arbon finance projects require a clear project boundary, clear tenure rights
in national law... and that rangeland owners can effectively exclude others from use," all
generally lacking for many dyland pastoralists); see aLvo Chasek et al., OperationalizingZNLD:
The Next Stage, supra note 5, at 6.

257. See Stringer et al., supra note 188, at 129 (marshaling evidence that "projects
emphasizing multiple environmental and social goals (e.g. biodiversity conservation,
reduced erosion, improved food security, employment opportunities, etc.) are much more

likely to succeed than those specializing in carbon sequestration alone").
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revenue source that would undoubtedly be quite valuable in LDNW
implementation, if these challenges could be overcome or cabined
in ways that didn't otherwise compromise the integrity or
manageability of the program. One could also imagine that given
LDNW's diverse goals, some might call for a "credit stacking"
approach, whereby the same parcel of land might participate in
various credit markets that reward it for preserving different
functions, although this is a relatively new concept that presents
many risks."" A full exploration of the role of environmental
markets for LDNW is beyond the scope of this article, but merits
discussion as LDNW gains momentum and takes further shape.
Even if LDNW does not pursue a strategy of integrating into
carbon markets, private actors might be involved in the program in
several ways. First, similar to some REDD+ countries, LDNW might
pursue a national fund model, perhaps with financing contingent
upon certain demonstrated actions, into which both developed
country governments and private entities might donate. 9 In this
case, private finance would likely be generated primarily by
corporate social responsibility commitments. 260 This method of
engagement with the private sector is likely to be the least lucrative
and may never generate significant sums, but it would also be the
safest in terms of insulating the program from the types of
concerns 1 that have accompanied private sector involvement in
26

REDD+.

A WMB model presents a second option for private sector
national governments could use LDNW as an
engagement:
opportunity to shift domestic legal baselines to require developers
of projects that would degrade certain land to engage in an equal
262
This strategy might be more difficult in
amount of restoration.
the case of land degradation than wetlands infill, given
degradation's myriad causes and the diverse actors involved, but it
258. See generally Royal C. Gardner & Jessica Fox, The Legal Status of Environmental Credit
Stacking, 40 EcOiLOGY L.Q. 713 (2013); see also David Cooley & Lydia Olander, Stacking
Ecosystem Services Payments: Risks and Solutions, 42 ENVrIL. L. REP. NEWS & ANANSI S 10150

(2012).
259.
260.

See generally Vatn & Vedeld, supra note 149.
See ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, supra note 179, at v (explaining that most voluntary

market purchases of REDD+ credits have come from social corporate responsibility
initiatives).
261. See supra notes 178-182 & accompanying text.
262. Cf 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344 (2012) (making discharge of pollutants into water illegal
except under specific sections, including receipt of a dredge and fill permit).

COLUMBIAJOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:1

might at least work to contain land degradation caused by major
new developments. Of course, such a scheme would also be subject
to all the pitfalls of WMB and other biodiversity offsetting schemes,
with restoration offsets unlikely to measure up to land degradation
losses for reasons discussed above. 263 Nevertheless, given that most
countries have a current baseline of no requirement of offsetting
for developers, even less-than-perfectly-successful domestic LDNW
offsetting requirements might produce some gains.
Finally, one other option that LDNW could pursue to engage
private actors is the creation-perhaps in conjunction with a
leading non-profit-of a certification scheme for "land degradation
neutrality."
Certification could be awarded to corporations
operating in developing countries that are verified to responsibly
offset any land degradation they cause via local restoration projects
(similar to schemes operating for forest management and carbon
sequestration in other contexts) .264 This strategy would again tackle
only a subset of the causes of land degradation, but might be a
worthwhile component of a larger program. It also, however,
might involve risks of "greenwashing," i.e., creation of a standard
not backed by real achievements on the ground, if not well
managed.265
These latter two options-domestic LDNW requirements
codified into law, or a private certification scheme for corporate
LDNW achievements-present many of the implementation risks
that have riddled REDD+. In asking corporations to engage in
restoration work directly, it is possible that they may do so in ways
not conducive to local participation or not in the best interest of all
local stakeholders.2

66

Accordingly, in designing LDNW, plans for

263. See sufra notes 128-39 & accompanying text.
264. Cf Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNEIL L. Ri,.V.
129, 148, 162, 170 (2013) (tracking the rise of such systems of "private environmental
governance," including 400 eco-labeling schemes now in existence, and arguing that they
can play an important role in tackling environmental problems, particularly cross-boundary
ones); Boyd & Salzman, supra note 178 (tracing the rise of the "gold standard" in carbon
markets that guarantees the quality of carbon reductions at a level above that required by
many compliance markets).
265. See Vandenbergh, supra note 264, at 137 (noting that private activity is "meaningless
or even harmful if it is just green-washing--private activity designed to give the appearance
of environmental benefits without delivering actual benefits").
266. Cf Narula, supra note 202, at 145 (arguing that any framework that treats land as a
commodity raises distributional concerns, as local populations may have their rights or
customary uses trampled by private developers).
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private participation should be accompanied by careful thinking
about advance protections that might best help corporate partners
engage with local communities in ways that ensure that their
actions will achieve LDNW's core goals. Or, LDNW might also
explore whether WMB's "in lieu fee" alternative-where developers
pay into government-run funds instead of undertaking actions
themselves-presents 26 a more appropriate model in the land
1
degradation context.
3. The Financing Challenge
Much like REDD+ (at least in its current early stages), LDNW is
likely to attract a preponderance of its funding from developed
country governments. Will the LDNW framing boost contributions
from the disappointing levels achieved under the desertification
regime? We believe that a well-executed LDNW plan does indeed
have this potential, precisely because of the UNCCD Secretariat's
observation that it "is strikingly clear and easy to communicate."2 "8
The clarity of the LDNW vision creates accountability-one of the
key factors missing in the desertification regime. 9
To facilitate this accountability, sufficiently reliable baselines will
be a critical first step, and a challenging one. Although the
desertification community has struggled in the past to develop
baselines,"O promising new technologies are being developed on
this front. As just one example, the Africa Soil Information Service
has announced an innovative effort to develop a "standardized
methodology for soil and land use monitoring and digital soil
mapping... utiliz[ing] novel data collection methodologies that
are efficient, cost-effective, and vastly improve the analytical
,,211I
precision of the landscape level estimates.
Strategic use of such
rapidly developing technologies may enable LDNW to leapfrog
some of the challenges encountered by past baseline establishment

267. See supra note 141. As noted earlier, Brazil has chosen to pursue a fee-based, rather
than an action-based, biodiversity offsetting program that might present an interesting
option for further study in this regard. See supra note 111.
268. A ST[RONGER UNCCD, supra note 7, at 7.
269. Cf Takacs, Forest Carbon, supra note 148, at 690 (observing that funding for climate
has been contingent on "meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on
implementation").
270.

See supra note 222.

271.
See Key Goals of the AJSIS Project, AFRICAN SOIL INFO. SERV., http://www.
africasoils.,tet/abotit/messages [http://perma.cc/L2YN-ESKF] (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
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efforts.
And indeed, the new LDNW framework presents a
tremendous opportunity for a new call to action for the
international community, perhaps one framed around "LDN'V
readiness funding." Such dedicated funding could be used to
establish global and regional baseline methodologies and to apply
these methodologies to create global and regional baselines from
whence to commence action. Country- or locality-specific readiness
funding might also be used to implement necessary governance
reforms or run pilot projects, similar to REDD+. REDD+ has
proven quite successful in generating readiness funding that is tied
explicitly to establishing baselines and building the governance and
monitoring capacities necessary to move to results-based funding.
Ultimately, it seems unlikely that LDNW will achieve the same
financial proportions as REDD+, as it will never be able to promise
the same scale of carbon reductions. But LDNW's strength lies in
the multiplicity of its aims. While not delivering the same carbon
"punch" as forests, other land types certainly do have the ability to
sequester carbon when well-managed.272 Similarly, LDNW may be
able to serve as a crucial adaptation tool as climate change
continues to transform and further degrade land. 7 3 And as an antipoverty, rural empowerment tool, LDNW also addresses
international security and migration issues that are of importance
to donor countries. It will be through this type of multi-faceted
pitch, combined with a new framework and ability to monitor and
measure progress, that LDNW might mobilize funding more
successfully than its predecessor efforts. Ultimately, though, the
program's ability to mobilize steady streams of funding will rest first
upon creating strong legal and scientific foundations, capable of
ensuring that legal definitions and measured variables equate with
real success.
A conversation must also be had about the international
institutional mechanisms necessary to carry LDNW forward. The
UNCCD, to be sure, has played and might continue to play a
cncial role, but its limited mandate will not allow for supervision
and implementation of the type of expansive program it has
272. See Grainger et al., supra note 25, at 363; CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICAN DRYLANDS,
supra note 43, at 38.
273. See generally SAHARA & SAIIEI. OBSERVATORY, sujra note 46 (outlining ways that
measures to halt and reverse desertification can contribute to the goals of adaptation, by
countering vulnerabilities through implementing measures that "increase capabilities or
decrease risks," ideally through "anticipatory adaptation" that occurs before impacts occur).
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articulated for LDNW.274 Nevertheless, actions within the scope of
the UNCCD might also be a part of the pluralistic activities that
drive LDNW forward-one could imagine, for example, a "No Net
Desertification" goal and convention protocol as successfully
clarifying and reorienting that convention in the same way that the
LDNW goal is intended to function more broadly.
Further
research and discussion about institutional avenues forward is
therefore important but not necessarily a crucial prerequisite to
action.
V.

CONCLUSION: MOVING

LDNW

FORWARD, WITH INTEGRITY

At this point, LDNW remains more of a vision than a reality. The
Rio+20 Outcome Document provides a foundation from which to
proceed, but it is not yet clear how much further traction LDNW
can secure, or whether it is the right pathway forward. We feel
cautiously optimistic, however, that if well designed, it would
represent an advancement in desertification policy and land policy
more generally. Implementing an LDNW regime is unlikely to
rapidly escalate land degradation up the world's agenda or to
quickly transform an ailing governance framework into a robust
and effective one. Nevertheless, it holds much promise, in part
because there is such universal agreement that the current efforts
to combat desertification and land degradation are struggling and
insufficient. Certainly, there is some risk in broadening the focus
away from desertification alone, to include all land types within a
single program's goal. On the other hand, LDNW also offers an
important crystallization of the concept of land as central to a
number of development objectives, which may help attract funding
that otherwise might not have gone specifically to desertification.
Moreover, a neutrality framework-challenging as it may be in
some ways-offers the distinct advantage of requiring, as a
prerequisite for any ability to claim success, a more rigorous
assessment and quantification of the state of land degradation in
the world currently. To be sure, such an assessment will prove
difficult and is likely to be imperfect, but it will nevertheless be an
important first step to building accountability into the land

274. Cf UNCCD, supra note 1, art. 2 (setting forth the Convention's objective as
specifically focused on combatting desertification and mitigating the effects of drought).

COLUMBIAJOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:1

degradation management regime that in turn unlocks more
international funding.
The examples of REDD+ and WMB do not allow for enthusiastic
endorsement of "neutrality"-framed land management programs.
"To neutralize" requires consensus around, and reasonable
measurements of, what is gained and what is lost in ways that have
proven ecologically and practically challenging for both programs,
for diverse sets of reasons that we have explored. But these efforts
have also laid the groundwork for the next generation of such
programs to proceed with greater knowledge of how to design with
integrity, for success. While we would not recommend importing
such models into contexts where the status quo is adequate but
imperfect, land degradation offers (if the pun can be excused)
fertile ground for experimentation in refraining and reorganizing
development targets and agendas, given the persistent decline in
land quality under current policies. REDD+ and WMB's lessons, if
heeded, will hopefully allow LDNW to take the best and leave the
worst of their models.

